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Chapter 1
Introduction
The paramount importance of politics for financial markets comes into the spotlight
of public interest in regular intervals. Unfortunately, this fervent interest has not been
matched by academic research, and the substantial amount of literature advancing into
the field has only begun to unveil the full dynamics political and institutional factors
impose on international stock returns.
Hitherto dominant as a paradigm and one of the fundamentals of finance, the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that, at any given time, asset prices on an
informationally efficient market fully reflect all available information (Fama (1970)).
Informational efficiency requires that markets absorb news instantaneously and that
prices are solely driven by new relevant information. Moreover, a market is said to be
efficient with respect to a specific information set if it is impossible to reap economic
profits, i.e., risk-adjusted returns net of all costs, by trading on the basis of that infor-
mation set (Jensen (1978), Malkiel (1992)). Important implications of this hypothesis
are that, first, prices reflect the true value of any asset and contain all available infor-
mation relevant for an investment decision and, second, investors cannot systematically
earn abnormal profits.
The EMH has consistently been challenged by empiricists and a plethora of papers
have documented long-term empirical regularities in returns that seem to contradict
the concept of market efficiency. These phenomena have been referred to as anomalies
because they cannot be explained within the paradigm of the EMH. Indeed, the study
of stock market anomalies has been one of the most captivating and proliferating areas
of financial market research during the last decades (for an overview see Singal (2004)).
Prominently figure calendar anomalies such as the January effect (Rozeff and Kinney
(1976), Reinganum (1983), Gultekin and Gultekin (1983)), the Monday effect (French
1
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(1980), Jaffe, Westerfield, and Ma (1989)), and the turn-of-the-month effect (Ariel
(1987), Lakonishok and Smidt (1988)) as well as the size effect (Banz (1981)) or the
weather effect (Saunders (1993), Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003)). In an attempt to
explain the puzzling persistence of these and other patterns despite existing arbitrage
opportunities, a growing field of research called “Behavioral Finance” (Shleifer (2000),
Shefrin (2002)) studies how cognitive or emotional biases create anomalies in market
prices and returns that may be inexplicable via EMH alone.1
Recently, the literature on stock market anomalies has been appended by new
and provocative empirical evidence on stock return patterns apparently induced by
political variables. While the interdependence of politics and economics is comfort-
ably established in the history of both disciplines and has produced such influential
theories as the partisan theory (Hibbs (1977)) or the theory of political business cycles
(Nordhaus (1975)), the linkage between politics and finance is less well-documented
and the evidence on political stock market cycles scarce yet tendentiously debated. In
particular, articles by Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) and Booth and Booth (2003)
have galvanized the finance community and initiated vivid academic curiosity to dissect
financial markets from a “political” angle. However, as of now the impact of political
variables and events on global equity markets remains a widely open empirical question.
A crucial influence on market efficiency constitutes the degree of institutional
trading in a stock. Different investor groups exhibit different trading behavior, and a
whole body of literature is devoted to disentangling the effects of institutional trading
(e.g., by pension or investment funds) as opposed to individual trading (by private
investors) on stock markets. If stock returns exhibit exploitable regularities and in-
stitutional investors act as smart traders who exploit such patterns using their infor-
mational advantage, anomalies are supposed to disappear as the trading activities of
this investor group arbitrage away systematic return patterns. If, on the other hand,
institutional investors move market prices away from their fundamentally justified level
due to strategic trading behavior, one could expect the anomaly to strengthen. The
academic debate on whether institutional investors improve or impair market efficiency
is far from being settled.
1 The fields of Behavioral Finance and Behavioral Economics emerged in the late 1970s when
psychologists began to benchmark their cognitive models of human judgment and decision-making
under risk and uncertainty against economic models of rational behavior. The most influential article
of that time, giving rise to a new research discipline, was by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In
recent years, the examination of behavioral aspects in finance and economics has gained momentum,
culminating in Daniel Kahneman’s 2002 Nobel laureate.
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This thesis is driven by the motivation to overcome several shortcomings in the
extant empirical finance literature by propounding and verifying a number of theoret-
ical predictions. At this juncture, much work on the relation between political and
institutional variables and financial markets lacks rigorous international investigation.
The present thesis, therefore, accomplishes the task of “globalizing” an important line
of research, filling in some voids in the international finance literature. Moreover, the
sprouting field of behavioral finance is given fresh impetus since some of the examined
issues could also be explained behaviorally. The body of this thesis consists of five
self-contained essays, subsumed under three broader chapters. In detail, the following
research questions are analyzed:
Chapter 2, titled “Political Cycles in Stock Market Returns”, provides a thorough
investigation into the behavior of stock market returns over political cycles. Prior
research documented that U.S. stock prices tend to grow faster during Democratic
than during Republican administrations (Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003)) and to be
boosted in the second half of the election cycle (Booth and Booth (2003)). Since these
patterns cannot be explained by market fundamentals, the findings lend support to the
existence of political stock market anomalies. However, the literature has barely looked
beyond the U.S. and few other mature markets. Broadening of the available empirical
evidence into an international dimension is crucial for several reasons: First, to warrant
the status of global stock market anomalies alongside calendar or size effects, similar
patterns should be observable in worldwide stock markets. Second, since political
variables change rather infrequently, a look beyond the U.S. mitigates the data snooping
bias and the risk of finding spurious relationships. For the sake of robustness, this
chapter is further divided into two independent studies with different emphasis.
Section 2.1 investigates the Democrat premium (Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003))
and the presidential cycle effect (Booth and Booth (2003)) in an international data set
covering the most important world stock markets in terms of market capitalization. The
cross-country approach facilitates the implementation of a panel framework, exploitable
with more powerful econometric tools (see, e.g., Wooldridge (2001), Baltagi (2005)),
in addition to an analysis of individual countries with different politico-institutional
settings. The conclusive economic momentum of any findings will not retain certainty
unless business cycle fluctuations are controlled for, tantamount to isolating the effects
of political from macroeconomic variables which earlier studies have ascribed predictive
power in forecasting stock returns (see, e.g., Fama (1991)). The results indicate that
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both deviations from market efficiency are not strikingly pervasive global phenomena
and in the preponderance of countries do not hold.
Section 2.2 takes a slightly different perspective in examining whether stock re-
turns elsewhere than in the U.S. also depend on the political orientation of the incum-
bents. Contradictory results of previous studies underline the sensitivity of estimates
with regard to sample characteristics. Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2007) ana-
lyze high-frequency data and claim that expected stock prices are actually higher under
right-wing U.S. presidents—a finding in sharp contrast with Santa-Clara and Valkanov
(2003). Nofsinger (2007) investigates the history of U.S. stock markets over a more
extended time horizon and concludes that, in the long run, there is little support of
any partisan premium. With this in mind, an additional examination is conducted in
a broader set of countries, accounting also for higher frequency movements in stock
prices around elections. Moreover, an event study unravels the question whether in-
vestment strategies based on governments’ political slant and built around election
dates are likely to yield profits. Results are not indicative of any systematic patterns
or exploitable trading strategies.
Chapter 3, titled “Stock Market Volatility around National Elections”, focusses
on market dynamics around elections. Political events, and elections in particular, are
a major influence on financial markets: “Markets tend to respond to new information
regarding political decisions that may impact on a nation’s fiscal and monetary policy.
As such, political events are closely followed by investors who revise their expectations
based on the outcome of these events. Among the many political events followed by
market participants, political elections are particularly important because: 1. Elec-
tions provide voters (and investors) with an opportunity to influence the course of the
medium- and long-term economic policies of a country. Voters choose whether to re-
elect incumbents based on their assessment of the states of candidates, parties, and
the nation prior to the election. 2. Elections are events that attract the attention of
media, pollsters, and political and financial analysts who filter information between
politicians and the public. This process disseminates information to financial markets.
3. As the election outcome becomes more certain, financial market participants revise
their prior probability distributions of policies to be implemented and the resulting
economic effects” (Pantzalis, Stangeland, and Turtle (2000)). Evidence of sharp price
movements in vote-casting periods will lend support to the conjecture that market par-
ticipants tend to be surprised by the actual election outcome. However, many earlier
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electoral studies are plagued with the fact that elections are essentially rare events,
thus providing scanty evidence to verify any theoretical predictions. Hence, the call
for a comprehensive international study is evident.
Moreover, this chapter takes the analysis of political determinants of stock mar-
ket behavior further from the first to the second moment of return distribution by
modelling return volatility in a GARCH framework.2 An event study then investigates
whether elections induce higher stock market volatility. This is highly relevant for
several reasons: First, the uncertainty about domestic election outcomes has impor-
tant implications for the optimal portfolio strategies of risk-averse investors who tend
to be insufficiently diversified on the international scale (French and Poterba (1991),
Baxter and Jermann (1997)). Second, participants of the options markets have a pow-
erful toolkit at hand to design lucrative volatility-based trading strategies. Finally, the
results may be of interest to pollsters as they serve as an indirect evaluation of the
quality of pre-election polls. In order to trace back any incidence of increased volatil-
ity around an election to its true source, an econometrically flawless isolation of the
country-specific component of index return variance is imperative. We proceed along
this path (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), Hilliard and Savickas (2002)) and
find that the country-specific part of volatility increases dramatically in the vicinity
of an election, which attests to the fact that investors are surprised by the ultimate
election outcome. On top, factors that magnify the election-induced excess volatility
are pinpointed.
In Chapter 4, titled “Institutional Investors and Stock Market Efficiency”, the
focus shifts from political to institutional determinants of stock return behavior. As
such, this chapter combines two empirical studies investigating the effects of institu-
tional trading on stock market anomalies in two of the Central and Eastern European
emerging markets. Comprehensive changes in the Polish and Hungarian pension sys-
tems promote the exploration of this issue in a privileged setting. At the end of
the 1990s, pension reforms took place in both countries and citizens were forced (in
Poland) or allowed (in Hungary) to transfer part of their gross income to privately
2 (G)ARCH-type models account for the fact that many financial and economic time series are
characterized by time-varying volatility, more specifically, (generalized) autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity, and allow for simultaneous estimation of mean and variance equations. ARCH
processes (introduced by Engle (1982)) recognize the difference between unconditional and conditional
variance allowing the latter to change over time as a function of past errors. GARCH processes (put
forth by Bollerslev (1986)) provide a generalization in that they assume conditional variance to be a
function of the past realizations of errors and past variances, thus facilitating a more parsimonious
parameterization. Robert F. Engle was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics 2003.
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managed pension funds. These large funds entered the stock market and induced a
considerable change in the investor composition on the Warsaw and Budapest Stock
Exchanges. Markets that were first populated by a predominantly individual investor
clientele changed to being dominated by institutional investors.
Section 4.1 investigates the impact of institutional investors on stock market effi-
ciency by focussing on the January stock market anomaly. The January effect implies
significantly higher returns in the first than in any other month (Rozeff and Kinney
(1976), Gultekin and Gultekin (1983)), is often concentrated in the trading days after
the turn of the year (Reinganum (1983)), and has been found to be attributable to two
prominent explanations: tax-loss selling by individual investors and window-dressing
by institutions. The Polish and Hungarian pension system reforms and the associated
increase in investment activities of pension funds are used as a unique characteristic to,
first, provide evidence on the impact of individual as opposed to institutional trading
on the January seasonality and, second, test the above-mentioned explanations. The
empirical results are favorable of the view that the increase in institutional ownership
has reduced the magnitude of abnormally high January returns previously induced by
individual investors’ trading behavior.
In Section 4.2 the implications of payment patterns on the Monday effect (French
(1980), Jaffe, Westerfield, and Ma (1989)) and the turn-of-the-month stock market
anomaly (Ariel (1987), Lakonishok and Smidt (1988)) are subjected to scrutiny. Again,
the special institutional setting the Polish and Hungarian stock markets provide is
exploited, with their history encompassing periods of predominately individual and
institutional trading. We find robust empirical evidence in favor of abnormally high
stock returns on the first Mondays of the month and the trading days around the turn
of the month. This pattern is consistent with the payment schemes in both countries
and more pronounced during the period of individual trading relative to the period of
increased institutional trading. Our findings are in line with Kamara (1997) and Chan,
Leung, and Wang (2004) who find support for U.S. stock markets that an increase in
institutional ownership has reduced the magnitude of the Monday anomaly.
The outlined research questions affect investors and academics alike: First, the
results may help investors to better understand the mechanisms at work on global stock
markets and to adjust their trading accordingly. The predictability of asset prices and,
hence, the possibility to forecast the future development of prices of financial assets
establishes a profit opportunity and is therefore of vital importance. Second, from
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an academic point of view, an examination of the dynamics of stock price behavior
conditional upon political and institutional variables may contribute to our general
understanding of stock market efficiency and inefficiencies.
Chapter 2
Political Cycles in Stock Market
Returns
2.1 International Evidence on the Democrat Pre-
mium and the Presidential Cycle Effect1
2.1.1 Motivation
Recently, the studies by Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) as well as Booth and Booth
(2003) have enriched the finance literature by providing new and provocative empirical
evidence on two stock market anomalies. Although the nexus between asset markets
and politics has not gone entirely unnoticed in the literature,2 both investigations are
the first to formally test the relationships and systematically examine their robustness.
Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) find economically and statistically significant higher
excess and real stock returns under U.S. Democratic presidencies than under Repub-
lican presidential administrations during the 1927–1998 period. This Democrat pre-
mium continues to hold after controlling for business cycle variables and time-varying
risk premia.
Booth and Booth (2003) confirm the empirical finding of higher excess returns
under Democratic presidents than under Republican presidents for a small stock port-
folio, while large stock excess returns are not significantly different from each other
1 This section is a revised version of an article published in the North American Journal of Eco-
nomics and Finance (Bohl and Gottschalk (2006)).
2 For example, Herbst and Slinkman (1984), Huang (1985), Stovall (1992), Ga¨rtner and Wellershoff
(1995), Hensel and Ziemba (1995), Johnson, Chittenden, and Jensen (1999), and Siegel (2002) docu-
ment an empirical relationship between stock returns and politics in the U.S. Foerster and Schmitz
(1997) examine the international pervasiveness of the U.S. election cycle and find robust empirical
evidence in favor of a statistically significant relationship. For an overview of political effects on stock
return dynamics, see also Bohl and Gottschalk (2005b).
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during the 1926–1996 period. Moreover, U.S. stock excess returns are significantly
higher in the last two years than in the first two years of the presidential term. This
presidential cycle effect in stock excess returns cannot be explained by business condi-
tion proxies. Hence, the documented influences of the political cycle on stock returns
in both investigations are puzzles and challenge the market efficiency hypothesis (Fama
(1970)).
The findings outlined above raise the question whether the nexus between stock
returns and politics holds beyond the U.S. Our investigation examines the hypothesis
of a Democrat premium and a presidential cycle effect for 15 stock markets including
the U.S. By broadening the evidence available in Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) and
in Booth and Booth (2003) to an international dimension, we provide a comparison
with the results contained in both studies and thereby reduce the data snooping bias.
Using the above-mentioned authors’ methodology, we are able to answer the question
whether these anomalies exist not only in the U.S. but also in countries with different
politico-institutional settings.3 Furthermore, our data set allows us to investigate both
anomalies in a panel framework. Compared to a separate investigation of individual
countries, the use of a panel exploits a larger number of observations and increases the
power of the statistical tests.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Subsection 2.1.2 we out-
line the econometric approaches to investigate the above-mentioned anomalies, while
Subsection 2.1.3 discusses the data. Subsection 2.1.4 contains the empirical results and
Subsection 2.1.5 concludes.
2.1.2 Methodology
Our empirical analysis of the Democrat premium relies on the following regression
equation:
rt+1 = α0 + α1LWt + c
′Xt + ut+1. (2.1)
The dependent variable denotes the excess stock market return rt+1 = r
NOM
t+1 − iSt+1,
where rNOMt+1 is the annualized nominal stock market return and i
S
t+1 the short-term
3 Scarce evidence in the existing literature suggests that this does not necessarily have to be the
case. Hudson, Keasey, and Dempsey (1998) find marked reactions in the UK stock market around the
election period but also note that the differences in returns under Tory and Labour governments are
statistically insignificant. Cahan, Malone, Powell, and Choti (2005) report that New Zealand stock
market returns were lower under left-leaning governments, which is in sharp contrast with the U.S.
findings. Bohl and Gottschalk (2005a) and Do¨pke and Pierdzioch (2006) repudiate that German stock
market returns tend to be higher during left-wing than during right-wing governments and that there
is an inherent election cycle.
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interest rate.4 LWt is a political dummy variable, Xt a vector of control variables, and
ut+1 the error term, ut+1 ∼ N(0, σ2). The political dummy variable LWt takes on the
value of 1 whenever a left-wing government is in office and 0 otherwise. The timing
of the variables emphasizes that the political dummy variable is known at the start
of the return period. Under the null hypothesis H0: α1 = 0, the orientation of the
government does not have an effect on stock returns. If the estimated parameter αˆ1
is statistically significant and positive (negative), then the evidence is favorable for a
Democrat (Republican) premium. We maintain the terminology introduced by previous
authors for the U.S. stock market and denote a left-wing premium as a Democrat
premium and a right-wing premium as a Republican premium, referring to the U.S.
party system.
In the compact depiction of Equation (2.1), a set of control variables Xkt is
subsumed under the 6×1 vector Xt, with X′t = (X1t, . . . , X6t). c′ denotes a 1×6 vector
of parameters, c′ = (c1, . . . , c6). The omission of macroeconomic control variables
related to the business cycle may lead to the misinterpretation of empirical findings
because the effect of the political dummy variable on stock returns might merely be a
reflection of business cycle fluctuations.5 Specifically, the vector Xt includes:
1. the logarithm of the dividend yield DPt;
2. the default spread DEFt, which is defined as the difference between the return
on a portfolio of corporate bonds and the return on long-term government bonds;
3. the term spread TERMt, which is the difference between a long-term government
bond yield and the short-term interest rate;
4. the relative interest rate RRELt, which is defined as the deviation of the short-
term interest rate from its one-year moving average; and
5. the expected inflation Et[INFt+1], which we approximate by the future actual
inflation rate.6
4 Both variables are expressed in logarithms. This specification is the same as in Santa-Clara and
Valkanov (2003) and makes our results directly comparable to theirs.
5 Previous research has found GDP growth to be slower during Republican presidential mandates
and inflation to be higher under Democratic administrations (see Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and
Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) for references).
6 We thank Pierre Siklos for suggesting this additional control variable. Because expected inflation
is generally unobservable by agents, previous studies have made diverse attempts to generate expected
inflation proxies. For an early comparison of forecast models, see for example Fama and Gibbons
(1984). An overview with related literature is also contained in Kolluri and Wahab (2008). In this
study, we use actual future inflation as a measure of inflationary expectations. This simple proxy goes
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6. the one-period lagged U.S. stock market return rUSt .
The use of these conditioning variables is widely accepted. The literature on the pre-
dictability of stock market returns shows that the variables listed can explain significant
variations in expected returns.7 We rely on this empirical evidence to separate business
cycle factors from political ones. We also include lagged U.S. stock market returns rUSt
to take into account the dependencies between the U.S. and other stock markets.
The presidential cycle effect is investigated in a similar manner by running the
regression
rt+1 = β0 + β1HALFt + c
′Xt + υt+1, (2.2)
where rt+1 denotes the excess stock market return over the short-term interest rate,
HALFt the political dummy variable, and Xt the vector of control variables. The
error term υt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2). The political dummy variable HALFt is set to 1 in the
second half of the government term and 0 otherwise.8 The remaining notation is the
same as above. We investigate the null hypothesis H0: β1 = 0. If the estimated
parameter βˆ1 is statistically significant and positive, then we have found evidence in
favor of a presidential cycle effect. Again, we follow the terminology used by Booth and
Booth (2003) and refer to the investigated phenomenon as the presidential cycle effect
although we actually examine the link between stock returns and government cycles.
In fact, most countries in our sample do not operate under a presidential system like
the U.S. but under parliamentary or semi-presidential systems with a Premier or Prime
Minister as the head of government and a President or Monarch as the—sometimes
merely symbolic—head of state.
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are estimated via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The
standard errors are made robust to potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
in the residuals using the Newey and West (1987) method. The bandwidth for the
beyond the traditional rational expectations premise in assuming the absence of shocks, i.e. a perfect
foresight equilibrium. Since this chapter is ultimately concerned with the effects of political variables
on stock market returns and relies on expected inflation merely as a control variable, we refrain from
fitting more sophisticated inflation forecast models to the 15 countries in our sample, while aware that
this might introduce a bias in our analysis.
7 See, for example, Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell and
Shiller (1988), Fama and French (1988), Fama and French (1989), Campbell (1991), Chen (1991),
Fama (1991), and Hodrick (1992).
8 We have also used two other definitions of the political dummy variable. First, HALFt was set
equal to 1 in the last 12 months of the government term and 0 throughout the rest of the election
cycle. Second, following Alesina and Roubini (1992), a “threshold” approach was implemented, i.e.,
if elections were too close to previous elections (less than two years), they were not included in the
tests. We report the findings of this robustness check below.
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Newey-West approach has been set to 12 lags.9 We estimate Equations (2.1) and (2.2)
as country-by-country regressions and as panel regressions. The panel regression model
applied is a fixed-effects model allowing for country-specific individual effects.10 Trans-
forming Equations (2.1) and (2.2) into this panel data model produces the following
regression equations for the Democrat premium and the presidential cycle effect, re-
spectively:
ri,t+1 = αi,0 + α1LWi,t + c
′Xi,t + ui,t+1, (2.3)
ri,t+1 = βi,0 + β1HALFi,t + c
′Xi,t + υi,t+1, (2.4)
where the subscript i denotes the cross-sectional dimension and t the time series di-
mension. Hence, ri,t+1 is the stock market return in country i at time t + 1. The
explanatory variables are defined accordingly. ui,t+1 ∼ N(0, σ2u) and υi,t+1 ∼ N(0, σ2υ).
Equivalently to Equation (2.1), statistical significance and a positive (negative) sign of
the estimated coefficient αˆ1 in Equation (2.3) is interpretable as evidence in favor of a
Democrat (Republican) premium. As in Equation (2.2), a statistically significant and
positive parameter estimate βˆ1 in Equation (2.4) can be seen as evidence in favor of a
presidential cycle effect in stock returns.
Equations (2.1) to (2.4) are estimated starting with the complete set of control
variables outlined above. Next, we exclude step by step the variables with statistically
insignificant coefficients at the 10% level. In the tables containing the empirical results
for the 15 individual countries and the panel, we report (1) findings of the regressions
including all control variables and (2) findings of the regressions including only control
variables with statistically significant parameters at the 10% level.
2.1.3 Data
All time series data are of monthly frequency. In the majority of cases, the time
series start in the period between 1957 and the early 1970s and end in 2004. The
9 We have implemented a number of different bandwidth specifications for estimating Newey-West
standard errors. Newey and West (1994) propose a “deterministic” rule which sets the number of lags
as a fixed function of the sample length. Another class of lag selection methods includes the Akaike or
Schwarz information criteria (Akaike (1974), Schwarz (1978)) or the general-to-specific methodology.
The application of the suggested methods to our regression models usually yielded different lag lengths.
Yet, the inclusion of 12 lags seemed to be a reasonable compromise, and our results are not sensitive
to different bandwidth specifications.
10 Other specifications of the model were considered, too. Among these were the inclusion of time-
specific effects and the use of a variable-slopes and variable-intercepts model. In the end, we did not
adopt these approaches to avoid a further loss of degrees of freedom. In addition, too many dummy
variables may aggravate the problem of multicollinearity among regressors.
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sample covers 15 developed stock markets: the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Japan, and ten European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK).11 The financial and economic
time series are mostly taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) provided
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The stock price indices contained in the
International Financial Statistics database in general represent a broad market average.
More detailed information on how these indices were constructed can be found in the
Country Notes accompanying the printed version. The monthly stock returns have
been annualized geometrically.12
The consumer price indices contained in the IFS are based on official statistics
provided by the individual countries. The long-term interest rate is the yield on a 10-
year government bond. As short-term interest rate we usually took the 3-month T-bill
rate. However, for a number of countries we had to switch to alternative short-term
interest rates (like the money market rate) because the otherwise exploitable sample
length did not meet our requirements. Also, in some cases, the problem of too many
missing values in some of the IFS time series had to be circumvented.
Dividend yields are taken from Thomson Financial Datastream. Default spreads
were calculated from a corporate bond benchmark and a government bond benchmark
also obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream. The term spread is the difference
between the 10-year government bond yield and the 3-month T-bill rate. Table 2.1
contains information about the availability of the time series for all individual countries.
[Insert Table 2.1 here]
The data collected for the construction of the political dummy variables include
election dates, dates of changes of governments, and the political orientation of all
incumbent governments throughout the sample period. These data were mainly taken
from Alesina and Roubini (1992), Johnson and Siklos (1996), Lane, McKay, and New-
ton (1997), Banks and Muller (1998), Pohl and Mayer (1998), Caramani (2000), and
Mu¨ller and Strøm (2003). Various internet sources were also considered, especially for
the more recent time periods.13 Table 2.2 provides information about the number of
11 Market capitalization of these countries accounts for over 80% of the global equity market (Bhat-
tacharya and Daouk (2002)).
12 The New Zealand stock price series was cleared of some outliers in 1998 that could not be
confirmed when considering alternative data sources.
13 In addition to the government web sites of the individual countries we consulted the follow-
ing internet sources: http://www.electionworld.org/, http://www.rulers.org/, http://www.
terra.es/personal2/monolith/, http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij/, http://psephos.adam-carr.
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election cycles as well as the average, minimum, and maximum duration of election
cycles in the 15 countries examined in this study. Moreover, the number of years when
left-wing and right-wing administrations were in office are listed.
[Insert Table 2.2 here]
It should be noted that the classification of governments into left-wing and right-
wing regimes and the identification of changes of political orientation of governments
are not always as straightforward and unambiguous as in classical two-party systems
like the U.S. or the UK. Some European countries indeed have a long tradition of center-
right or center-left coalition governments, whose orientation can hardly be captured
by a left-wing versus right-wing classification scheme without further differentiating.
This is particularly true for Italy. Nevertheless, we tried to minimize the remaining
ambiguities by assessing and consolidating the maximum range of information which
was available to us. In case of doubt, we usually followed the conventions by Alesina
and Roubini (1992), who obtained their classification of right-wing and left-wing gov-
ernments from Alt (1985) and Banks and Muller (1998).
A further critical issue is the treatment of cases like the French cohabitation,
which denotes a time period when the President and the Prime Minister in office
belong to parties of different political orientation and, therefore, the political executive
(exercised by the French President or the Prime Minister in their respective areas)
is divided between a leftist and a rightist party. In this specific circumstance, we
considered the political party of the Prime Minister as the relevant one.
2.1.4 Empirical Results
2.1.4.1 Democrat Premium
First, we estimate Equation (2.1) in order to investigate the Democrat premium for
the 15 individual countries and the panel using excess stock returns. Results are
shown in Table 2.3. The majority of the adjusted coefficients of determination R
2
is of reasonable size, but the coefficients of the control variables do not in all cases
have the theoretically expected sign. More importantly, however, the coefficients of
the political dummy variable LWt are statistically insignificant at the 10% level for 12
countries. By contrast, Denmark, Germany, and the U.S. show a left-wing premium.
net/, http://www.electionresources.org/, http://en.wikipedia.org/, and http://www.
parties-and-elections.de/.
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Comparable results are documented in Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) for the U.S.
The evidence is robust concerning the selection of lags in the Newey-West approach14
and the exclusion of statistically insignificant estimated coefficients. Moreover, the
results of the panel regressions are not supportive of the hypothesis that the political
orientation of the government exerts an influence on excess stock returns. The finding
of a left-wing premium is rather an exception.
[Insert Table 2.3 here]
2.1.4.2 Presidential Cycle Effect
Next, we examine the empirical results of the presidential cycle effect reported in Ta-
ble 2.4. When looking at the results for individual countries, in the majority of cases
the findings are not supportive of a presidential cycle effect in excess stock returns.
For 11 countries the coefficients for the political dummy variable HALFt are statisti-
cally insignificant. This finding is robust with respect to the selection of lags in the
Newey-West approach (results are not reported but available on request) as well as the
exclusion of insignificant coefficients of explanatory variables. There is some evidence
that excess stock returns in Austria, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand are
higher in the second half of the government term compared to the first half. Neverthe-
less, the empirical findings for these countries are not robust across all specifications.
These findings do not support the results documented in Booth and Booth (2003) for
the U.S. Sweden, as an exception, exhibits significantly higher excess stock returns in
the first half of the presidential term.
[Insert Table 2.4 here]
A closer look at the results of the panel regressions reveals that the parameters of
the presidential cycle dummy variable HALFt do not have the theoretically expected
sign and are statistically insignificant. Similar to the findings on the Democrat premium
above, the international evidence is not favorable for the existence of a presidential cycle
effect in excess stock returns.
14 Results are not reported but available on request.
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2.1.4.3 Robustness Checks
In addition to the findings reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 we performed a comprehensive
robustness check. First, we re-estimated all regressions using nominal instead of excess
stock market returns. Robust evidence in favor of a right-wing premium can be found
only for Belgium, while for the remaining countries the parameters of the political
variable are insignificant or show mixed results. With respect to the presidential cycle
effect a similar picture emerges. Only for Austria, Canada, and Japan the political
dummy variable is significant and positive. The evidence of the panel regressions is
not favorable for a left-wing or right-wing premium and a presidential cycle effect.
Hence, the findings relying on nominal stock returns do not change our conclusions on
the existence of both political anomalies discussed above.
Second, the implementation of a threshold approach which excludes elections
from the tests that are too close (less than two years) to previous elections did not
affect our results at all. In contrast, the alternative specification of the presidential
cycle dummy variable, where HALFt is set to 1 only in the last year of the government
term, yielded slightly different results. With this definition of HALFt, the presidential
cycle effect detected in Canadian excess stock returns continues to hold. Furthermore,
we now find a “reverse” presidential cycle effect with significantly higher returns in
the first part of the government term in Italy. The other countries do not show any
significant effects. Again, the panel investigation shows that a presidential cycle effect
does not exist in the international data for either specification of the HALFt dummy
variable.
Third, one might conjecture that potential differences in stock returns between
left- and right-wing governments or between the first and the second half of the govern-
ment term are driven by abnormally high or low returns around the election date.15 In
order to investigate this hypothesis we add another dummy variable to our regression
models which is meant to capture such exceptional effects. This dummy takes on the
value of 1 in an election month and 0 otherwise. However, our main results concerning
the Democrat premium and the presidential cycle effect were unaffected. We therefore
conclude that in countries with an apparent left-wing premium or presidential cycle
effect, this pattern is not due to abnormal returns in the election month.
15 We take into account the possibility that unpredicted events which are related to the election
and are not captured in expected stock returns influence our empirical findings.
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2.1.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this section, we provide new empirical findings on the Democrat premium and the
presidential cycle effect by examining the implications of these hypotheses across 15
countries including the U.S. According to the Democrat premium hypothesis, stock
returns are higher under left-wing than under right-wing administrations. The presi-
dential cycle effect implies higher stock returns in the last half than in the first half of
the government term. Since previous empirical evidence on either anomaly is limited to
the U.S. (Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003), Booth and Booth (2003)), we broaden the
empirical findings on the nexus between stock markets and politics to an international
dimension.
We find empirical evidence that both stock market anomalies are an exception
rather than the rule. Out of the 15 countries under investigation, only the evidence
for Denmark, Germany, and the U.S. is favorable for a left-wing premium. Similarly,
supportive but non-robust evidence for a presidential cycle effect can be found only
for Austria, Canada, and the Netherlands. More importantly, the empirical findings
of the panel regressions do not bolster any of the two stock market anomalies. We
therefore conclude that the Democrat premium and the presidential cycle effect are
not strikingly pervasive global phenomena.
When interpreting our empirical results and comparing them with the findings for
the U.S., some words of caution are in order, though. First, for many of the countries in
our sample the classification into left-wing and right-wing governments is not as clear-
cut as for the U.S. Second, we cannot completely rule out an influence on our empirical
results from the fact that in the U.S. the President is both head of state and head of
government, whereas in most of the countries under investigation a Prime Minister is
heading the government without being, at the same time, head of state. Third, left-
wing and right-wing governments alter fairly regularly in the U.S. By contrast, in most
of the countries in our data set either left-wing or right-wing administrations dominate
the sample.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Political Variables
Election Cycle Tenure
Number of Average Minimum Maximum Left-Wing Right-Wing
Election Duration Duration Duration Govern- Govern-
Country Cycles ment ment
Australia 18 2.55 1.46 3.10 15.93 32.06
Austria 13 3.35 1.19 4.01 29.79 18.21
Belgium 14 3.21 1.67 4.16 8.19 39.80
Canada 15 3.14 0.74 4.93 32.27 15.70
Denmark 17 2.62 0.67 3.85 29.74 18.25
France 11 3.96 1.28 5.04 15.99 31.97
Germany 12 3.75 2.40 4.02 19.10 28.90
Italy1 11 3.91 1.98 5.06 10.94 36.03
Japan 15 3.03 0.71 3.99 1.53 46.37
Netherlands 13 3.37 0.69 4.65 14.49 33.50
New Zealand 15 2.98 2.63 3.20 17.28 30.72
Norway 11 3.99 3.93 4.01 30.27 17.73
Sweden 14 3.16 2.01 4.01 38.99 9.01
United Kingdom 11 3.79 0.61 5.06 18.52 29.48
United States 11 4.00 3.99 4.01 20.00 28.00
Panel 201 3.31 0.61 5.06 303.03 415.73
Note: This table presents aggregate information on the political variables used in this study.
For each country, it reports the number of election cycles completed between 1957:01 and
2004:12 as well as their average, minimum, and maximum duration in years. Furthermore,
the total number of years left-wing and right-wing administrations were in office is provided.
1 For Italy, columns 6 and 7 do not add up to 48 years because the 1993–1994 Ciampi administration
was not attributed to any political camp. All other deviations are due to rounding.
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2.2 Political Orientation of Government and Stock
Market Returns16
2.2.1 Motivation
An important question faced by every voter on Election Day is which of the parties
is best equipped to foster the development of economy and capital markets. In the
pursuit of their own political agenda, the winning party or coalition can fine-tune
fiscal policy and significantly impact future economic outcomes. Depending on their
political orientation, the objectives of different political camps can be quite disparate.
As suggested by the partisan theory of Hibbs (1977), left-wing governments tend to
cater for the well-being of their working class electorate by targeting unemployment.
Right-wing governments, on the other hand, prioritize reduction in inflation feared by
higher income and occupational status groups.17
Several earlier papers focussed specifically on the relationship between the polit-
ical orientation of the executive branch of government and stock market performance.
Johnson, Chittenden, and Jensen (1999) and Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) report
that U.S. stock market returns were higher under Democratic than Republican pres-
idencies, with the difference being particularly large for small-stock portfolios. This
anomaly cannot be explained away by variations in business cycle proxies. Huang
(1985) and Hensel and Ziemba (1995) look at whether presidential trading strategies
are able to improve investors’ risk-return trade-off.
From an international investor’s perspective, it would be interesting to know
whether the conclusions obtained from the U.S. data can be generalized to accom-
modate a global context.18 The existing literature offers some indications that this
does not necessarily have to be the case. Hudson, Keasey, and Dempsey (1998) find
marked reactions in the UK stock market around the election period but also note
that the differences in returns under Tory and Labour governments are statistically
insignificant. Cahan, Malone, Powell, and Choti (2005) report that New Zealand stock
market returns were lower under left-leaning governments, which is in sharp contrast
16 This section is a revised version of an article published in the Applied Financial Economics Letters
(BiaÃlkowski, Gottschalk, and Wisniewski (2007)).
17 The nexus between inflation and asset prices has been established in Al-Khazali and Pyun (2004)
and Maghyereh (2006).
18 Papers that have established profitable trading strategies for the U.S. are Umstead (1977), Riley
and Luksetich (1980), and Ga¨rtner and Wellershoff (1995). Bohl, Do¨pke, and Pierdzioch (2008)
question these findings.
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with the U.S. findings. Our investigation adds to the presidential puzzle literature by
extending the empirical analysis beyond a single stock market. The data set compiled
for this study covers 24 OECD countries and 173 different governments. Since elec-
tions are relatively infrequent, a multi-country approach allows increasing the number
of observations and the power of statistical tests.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Subsection 2.2.2 describes
data sources and sample characteristics, while Subsection 2.2.3 briefly outlines the
econometric methods applied. Subsection 2.2.4 investigates the behavior of stock mar-
ket indices around Election Day and throughout the tenure of different administrations.
The implications for investors and conclusions are contained in Subsection 2.2.5.
2.2.2 Data
In order to investigate the nexus between political variables and stock returns, the
author attempted to construct a comprehensive data set including all OECD coun-
tries. Regrettably, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovakia, South Korea, and Switzer-
land had to be excluded from the analysis because either Morgan Stanley Capital
International Inc. (MSCI) did not provide data on stock market indices for these cap-
ital markets or there was not a single change in the orientation of the government
throughout the period for which the index was available. The returns for the remain-
ing 24 countries19 were computed using the U.S. dollar denominated, value-weighted,
and dividend-adjusted MSCI Country Indices spanning a period from January 1980
through December 2005. Whenever daily data on the MSCI index was not available
from January 1980, the sample period was adjusted accordingly. The stock market
data were sourced from Thomson Financial Datastream.
The prevailing political system in a given country (presidential or parliamentary)
determines the relevant type of election that will be examined. Election dates as well
as the exact start and end dates of each government’s term in office were obtained
from Lane, McKay, and Newton (1997), Laver and Schofield (1998), Caramani (2000),
Mu¨ller and Strøm (2003), and Banks, Muller, and Overstreet (2004). The classification
of governments into left- and right-leaning administrations was taken from Alt (1985),
Alesina and Roubini (1992), and Banks, Muller, and Overstreet (2004). Coalition
governments were attributed to the political camp they are conventionally associated
19 This results in 19 developed markets (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
UK, U.S.) and 5 emerging markets (Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Turkey).
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with. Table 2.5 describes the characteristics of the political and financial variables used
in this study.
[Insert Table 2.5 here]
Over 60% of the countries had daily MSCI index data available from January
1980, whereas in the remaining cases the index starts at a later date. Among the 24
nations, Denmark and Australia had the highest number of governments included and
Greece had the lowest due to short index availability. The data set covers a comparable
number of 85 left-wing and 88 right-wing governments. Although the number of right-
wing cabinets was slightly higher, the left-wing governments had tenures that were on
average 70 days longer. This translates into a longer overall term in office for the left
camp.
2.2.3 Methodology
This study quantifies the effect of government orientation on stock market returns, both
around and in-between elections. First, in order to analyze return dynamics around
the election date, a simple event study is conducted (see, e.g., Campbell, Lo, and
MacKinlay (1997) or Wilkens and Wimschulte (2005)).20 The event day is defined as
the Election Day or, for those instances when elections took place during the weekend
or on a bank holiday, the trading day thereafter. For the purpose of comparison, two
sets of events are considered: left-wing electoral victories (“L wins”) and right-wing
triumphs (“R wins”). Conventions in the related literature motivate the set up of
T = 250 days for the estimation and calibration period, while the event window spans
51 days and is centered around the election (day zero).
To estimate the election’s impact in any of the two cases, we first require a
measure of normal stock market performance, i.e., returns to be expected without
the election event. Abnormal returns can then be computed by subtracting expected
returns E(ri,t) from actual returns ri,t. In the context of this study, a market-adjusted
20 Event studies were first introduced to economics by the seminal studies of Ball and Brown
(1968) and Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) and have been widely used as a methodological
tool since then. For overview articles see, e.g., MacKinlay (1997) or Binder (1998). Brown and
Warner (1980), for monthly data, and Brown and Warner (1985), for daily data, are useful papers
that discuss several methodological improvements since the pioneering studies and consider practical
implementation issues.
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model is adopted and abnormal returns ARi,t relative to the benchmark are derived as
follows:
ARi,t = ri,t − E(ri,t) = ri,t − 1
T
T∑
s=1
rM,s. (2.5)
ri,t and rM,s are the continuously compounded returns of country index i and the world
index, respectively, over a one-day period. The subtrahend in Equation (2.5) represents
our measure of normal stock market performance: the arithmetic average of market
returns over the length of the estimation window (T days).21
The abnormal returns ARi,t are subsequently averaged across all N relevant
events to yield the average abnormal return at time t:
ARt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ARi,t. (2.7)
The average abnormal returns ARt are then cumulated over the period (t1, t2) in order
to produce an estimate of the cumulative average abnormal return during the event
window:
CARt1,t2 =
t2∑
t=t1
1
N
N∑
i=1
ARi,t. (2.8)
The statistical significance of CARt1,t2 is evaluated using the following standard test
statistic (Brown and Warner (1985)):
t
B/W
CARt1,t2
=
CARt1,t2
σˆ(ARt)
√
t2 − t1 + 1
, (2.9)
where CARt1,t2 is the cumulative average abnormal return over the event window (t1, t2)
and σˆ(ARt) is the estimated standard deviation of the average abnormal returns ARt
computed in the time-series dimension. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic
in Equation (2.9) follows a t-distribution with 249 degrees of freedom (see Brown and
Warner (1985)). For sufficiently large calibration periods, the Student-t distribution
can be approximated sufficiently accurately by a standard normal distribution.
21 The results of the event study and their validity will depend substantially on the appropriateness
of the assumed return model. For the sake of robustness, we also implement a market model (Sharpe
(1963)) as the relevant benchmark:
ARi,t = ri,t − E(ri,t) = ri,t − (αˆi + βˆirM,t), (2.6)
where ARi,t and ri,t are as previously labelled, rM,t denotes the return of the market portfolio, and
αˆi and βˆi are the parameter estimates of the market model. Results are not reported since they were
very similar to the above specification.
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Next, we take a closer look at average stock market returns over the entire term
of leftist and rightist governments. For either political camp in each particular country,
daily returns are annualized according to the following formula:
(GovDays∑
i=1
ri
)
/
( GovDays
TradeDays
)
, (2.10)
where ri denotes the daily stock market return, GovDays corresponds to the total
number of days left-wing (right-wing) governments were in office and TradeDays to
the number of trading days. A bootstrap test (Efron (1979)) based on 1,000 replications
is then used to determine whether the difference between mean annual returns under
left-wing and right-wing governments is statistically significant.
2.2.4 Results
2.2.4.1 Abnormal Returns around Election Day
One of the features of political systems is that elections do not necessarily coincide with
an immediate change in the executive. For instance, U.S. elections are always held on
Tuesday following the first Monday of November, whereas the presidential term starts
on the 20th of January the following year. This study investigates the relationship
between politics and stock markets by focussing both on the entire term of office and
on the particular day voters cast their ballots.
It is conceivable that in the face of political changes investors adjust their re-
quired risk premium on assets. If they attribute greater uncertainty to the left of the
political scene, the stock market will be expected to offer higher returns under left-wing
incumbencies. The higher returns would be a form of compensation for the increased
risk. In this scenario, however, the prices on Election Day are likely to plummet. This
is an immediate consequence of the increased discount rate and the resultant lower
present value of future cash flows of all firms. The story of changing risk premia is
consistent with the previously discussed presidential puzzle (Santa-Clara and Valkanov
(2003)) and Riley and Luksetich (1980) findings showing the existence of negative re-
turns around Election Day for Democratic victories and positive returns for Republican
wins.
[Insert Figure 2.1 here]
In its first step, this analysis examines international stock market patterns around
Election Day using a simple event study. The abnormal returns are defined as difference
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between the returns on the respective MSCI Country Index and the MSCI World Index.
Figure 2.1 depicts the cumulative abnormal returns separated by orientation of the
election winner. The plots show no apparent market reaction around the day when
the uncertainty about future political leadership is resolved. The cumulative abnormal
returns for the right-wing and left-wing election winners oscillate within a narrow range
and fail to reach statistical significance. Consequently, the conclusion that investors re-
adjust their discount rates in response to election results is not supported in our data.
It is also unlikely that highly profitable trading strategies based on the predictions of
election outcomes can be designed.
2.2.4.2 Returns during the Term of Office
Having established that the announcement effect around elections is negligible, our
focus turns to measuring stock market performance throughout different incumbencies.
Table 2.6 presents the U.S. dollar denominated annualized returns corresponding to
calendar years of tenure.22 The second column shows mean returns under left-wing
rules and is juxtaposed with the third column which reports similar statistics for the
right-wing governments. A bootstrap test based on 1,000 replications is used to verify
whether the difference between these two columns is equal to zero.
[Insert Table 2.6 here]
According to Table 2.6, the Democrat premium in the U.S. is around 7.7% per
annum, which is in line with the findings of previous studies using value-weighted in-
dices (see Huang (1985), Johnson, Chittenden, and Jensen (1999), and Santa-Clara
and Valkanov (2003)). The U.S. experience does not, however, generalize in the global
context. A closer inspection reveals that 14 out of the 24 considered stock markets ac-
tually offered a right-wing government premium (yet not statistically significant). Out
of the five cases with bootstrap p-value below 10%, two favored right-wing governments
and three favored the political left. Overall, the stock market returns were 34 basis
points higher when the left-wing cabinets were in power, but this result is not statis-
tically significant. In light of these findings, international investors should exercise a
great deal of caution whenever speculating on the orientation of the executive.
22 We present nominal stock market returns. Adjusting for inflation, however, does not alter our
qualitative results and main conclusions.
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2.2.5 Summary and Conclusions
Several earlier papers noted that U.S. stock prices tend to grow faster when Democrats
are in office (see, e.g., Huang (1985), Johnson, Chittenden, and Jensen (1999), Santa-
Clara and Valkanov (2003)). This anomaly persisted for almost a century and oppor-
tunities to exploit it in security trading were present. Since political orientation of the
incumbent president is common knowledge, this result may prima facie appear as a
violation of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Alternatively, it may be interpreted as
an increased risk premium accruing to investors who decide to hold stocks through-
out the tenure of left-wing administrations. If the latter explanation was correct, one
would expect high returns during left-wing rules not only in the U.S. but also in other
countries.
To verify the above-mentioned hypothesis, this study uses a comprehensive data
set covering 24 OECD countries and 173 governments. The results based on the in-
ternational sample indicate that there are no statistically significant differences in re-
turns between left-wing and right-wing governments neither in the election period nor
throughout the tenure. The anomaly observed in the U.S. appears to be country-
specific and investors who diversify their portfolios internationally should be wary of
allocating their money based solely on the political orientation of the countries’ leader-
ship. The evidence reported here lends support to the notion of efficient markets and
randomness of stock prices (Fama (1970)).
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2.2.6 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns across Political Camps
Note: This figure depicts cumulative abnormal returns around Election Day (Day 0) for right-wing
and left-wing government wins. In instances where elections took place during the weekend, Day
0 is defined as the first day of trading after the elections. Abnormal returns are calculated as the
difference between the return on the respective MSCI Country Index and the MSCI World Index.
They are subsequently averaged across all relevant events and cumulated over time to obtain the
cumulative abnormal return.
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Table 2.5: Sample Description
MSCI Index Number of Number of Number of Days Number of Days
Starting Left-Wing Right-Wing Left-Wing Right-Wing
Date Govern- Govern- Government Government
Country ments ments in Office in Office
Australia 01-Jan-80 5 6 4,749 4,382
Austria 01-Jan-80 6 2 7,339 1,792
Belgium 01-Jan-80 2 6 1,999 7,132
Canada 01-Jan-80 5 3 5,734 3,397
Czech Republic 30-Dec-94 2 2 2,359 1,295
Denmark 01-Jan-80 5 6 4,211 4,920
Finland 01-Jan-87 5 1 5,126 1,448
France 01-Jan-80 4 4 5,346 3,785
Germany 01-Jan-80 4 5 3,261 5,870
Greece 01-Jun-01 1 1 1,013 296
Hungary 02-Jan-95 2 1 2,230 1,421
Italy 01-Jan-80 6 3 7,487 1,644
Japan 02-Jan-80 1 9 885 8,245
Mexico 01-Jan-88 3 1 4,718 1,491
Netherlands 01-Jan-80 2 7 2,891 6,240
New Zealand 02-Jan-87 4 3 3,248 3,325
Norway 01-Jan-80 5 5 5,029 4,102
Poland 01-Jan-93 2 2 2,635 1,747
Portugal 04-Jan-88 2 3 2,350 3,856
Spain 01-Jan-80 5 3 5,161 3,970
Sweden 01-Jan-80 6 2 7,021 2,110
Turkey 04-Jan-88 2 4 1,407 4,799
United Kingdom 01-Jan-80 3 4 2,800 6,331
United States 01-Jan-80 3 5 3,307 5,824
Overall 85 88 92,306 89,422
Note: The first column lists all of the 24 OECD countries included in the sample. The dates from
which daily stock prices for the respective MSCI Country Indices became available in Datastream
are shown in the second column. For any given country, the number of left-wing and right-wing
governments that were in office between the index start date and the end of 2005 are indicated, as
well as the overall number of days corresponding to the tenures of either political camp.
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Table 2.6: Political Orientation of Government and Stock Market Returns
Returns (%)
Country Left-Wing Right-Wing Difference Bootstrap p-Value
Australia 11.0897 2.0911 8.9986 0.1140
Austria 4.5204 19.4968 −14.9764 0.0490∗∗
Belgium 2.3024 9.8324 −7.5300 0.2060
Canada 5.6661 7.7861 −2.1200 0.3680
Czech Republic 18.1543 −3.9685 22.1228 0.0730∗
Denmark −0.8029 13.3258 −14.1287 0.1090
Finland 9.9560 12.9370 −2.9810 0.4440
France 13.4530 1.5492 11.9038 0.0690∗
Germany −4.1297 14.1892 −18.3189 0.0160∗∗
Greece 3.1633 31.0425 −27.8792 0.1480
Hungary 33.4150 −5.9310 39.3460 0.0190∗∗
Italy 10.9697 2.9079 8.0618 0.2260
Japan 0.4352 7.9392 −7.5041 0.2690
Mexico 20.1139 13.8611 6.2528 0.3610
Netherlands 4.9962 11.1087 −6.1125 0.2330
New Zealand −3.9651 3.0679 −7.0330 0.2460
Norway 3.3169 9.9913 −6.6744 0.2020
Poland 8.0489 28.1800 −20.1311 0.1690
Portugal 4.5779 0.3350 4.2429 0.3320
Spain 12.4139 3.0942 9.3197 0.1270
Sweden 15.0895 9.7092 5.3803 0.3030
Turkey 0.9501 8.2212 −7.2711 0.3670
United Kingdom 3.1467 10.6031 −7.4564 0.1490
United States 13.9556 6.2568 7.6988 0.1230
Overall 8.6992 8.3588 0.3404 0.5580
Note: The first column lists all of the 24 countries included in our sample. The next two columns
report annualized US$-denominated average stock market returns during the tenure of left-wing and
right-wing governments. Column 4 shows the difference between the two estimates. The last column
lists the bootstrap p-values for the null hypotheses that the differences in column 4 equal zero. The
bootstrap procedure was performed as follows: For a single bootstrap, sample returns were drawn
at random with replacement to match the number of days in office for the left-wing and right-wing
governments in our original sample. Subsequently, the annualized average returns for both camps
were computed and the difference was recorded. This procedure was repeated 1,000 times to develop
an empirical distribution for the difference under the null and the p-value was extracted from this
distribution. ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Chapter 3
Stock Market Volatility around
National Elections1
3.1 Motivation
Country’s politics can exert significant influence on its income distribution and pros-
perity. In democratic states, voters elect parties which best represent their personal
beliefs and interests. According to partisan theory propounded by Hibbs (1977), left-
ist governments tend to prioritize the reduction of unemployment, whereas right-wing
governments attribute higher social costs to inflation. Another influential theory pre-
sented by Nordhaus (1975) postulates that, irrespective of their political orientation,
incumbents will pursue policies that maximize their chances of re-election. As a result,
they will try to self-servingly attune the business cycle to the timing of elections. The
economy will be stimulated by unsustainable expansionary policies before the elections,
and harsh actions aimed at curbing the resultant inflation will have to follow at the be-
ginning of the new term of office. It has to be noted, however, that any policy-induced
cycles in real activity will be ephemeral if the economic agents and voters have rational
expectations (Alesina (1987), Rogoff (1990)).
Several recent papers look at whether security returns are impacted by politics.
Booth and Booth (2003) report that the U.S. stock market tends to perform better in
the second half of the presidential term. This phenomenon could be a reflection of the
political business cycle but can also be explained behaviorally. The authors argue that
investors may be over-optimistic about the implications of the impending elections,
but their optimism wears off quickly once the new administration fails to keep its
1 This chapter is a preprint version of an article published in the Journal of Banking & Finance
(BiaÃlkowski, Gottschalk, and Wisniewski (2008)).
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election campaign promises. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) show that the market
excess return was higher under Democrat than Republican presidencies throughout
the period from 1927 to 1998. This anomaly cannot be explained away by variation in
business condition proxies. Additional evidence is provided by Nofsinger (2007), who
contends that the stock market is a barometer of public sentiment and its movements
can indicate whether incumbents will be re-elected.
Our inquiry adds to the discussion on the interplay between politics and stock
prices in meaningful ways. Most of the previous empirical studies focus exclusively
on U.S. data.2 Since elections are essentially rare events, the single-country approach
leads to a small sample and many statistical problems specific to it. To overcome
this obstacle, the data set compiled for this study covers 27 industrialized nations.
Furthermore, the basic conceptual framework proposed here departs slightly from the
convention adopted in prior literature. Instead of examining the fortunes of the stock
market throughout the tenure of different administrations, this analysis concentrates
on the return variability around election dates. Evidence of extreme price movements
in these periods will lend support to the conjecture that market participants tend to
be surprised by the actual election results.
The investigation into return volatility is warranted on at least three grounds.
First, the uncertainty about the election outcome has important implications for risk-
averse investors. Prior research has shown that investors are undiversified interna-
tionally and exhibit a significant home bias (French and Poterba (1991), Baxter and
Jermann (1997)). Since they hold predominantly domestic assets, the country-specific
political risk will not diffuse in their portfolios. Consequently, the sole event of elec-
tions in their home country could have serious implications for the risk level of their
portfolios. Second, any market-wide fluctuations in response to election shocks will
augment the systematic volatility of all stocks listed. It is therefore conceivable that
option prices could increase around the time when voters cast their ballots. Finally, the
results reported here can be of interest to pollsters as they provide indirect evidence
on whether the accuracy of pre-election forecasts suffices for practical applications. An
observation of substantial volatility hikes around Election Day would indicate that the
2 In addition to the aforementioned Booth and Booth (2003), Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003),
and Nofsinger (2007), several earlier papers deal with the issue of an election cycle in U.S. security
returns. See Niederhoffer, Gibbs, and Bullock (1970), Allvine and O’Neill (1980), Riley and Luksetich
(1980), Herbst and Slinkman (1984), Huang (1985), Stovall (1992), Ga¨rtner and Wellershoff (1995),
Hensel and Ziemba (1995), and Johnson, Chittenden, and Jensen (1999).
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efforts to formulate precise predictions should be furthered and additional resources
need to be directed towards this end.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a sys-
tematic review of the techniques used in election forecasting and discusses the accuracy
of these techniques. Section 3.3 outlines the methodological framework in which the
null hypothesis of no election surprise is tested. The description of the data set and
discussion of empirical results follow subsequently, in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. Sections 3.6
and 3.7 investigate the robustness of results and implications for investors. Section 3.8
concludes the chapter.
3.2 Predicting Election Outcomes
Public opinion surveying has become an integral part of today’s political landscape.
In the heat of election campaigns, the results of major surveys appear as cover-page
stories, and politicians commission private polls, which provide them with strategic
information. Pre-election surveying has a long and intriguing history, but it has to be
noted that many of the early polls were plagued with serious methodological problems,
which rendered their predictions unreliable (Squire (1988), Cahalan (1989)). It was
not until the 1930s that scientific procedures such as quota sampling were introduced
(Gallup and Robinson (1938)). Having realized the importance of appropriate sam-
ple selection, polltakers began improving their statistical apparatus, gradually moving
towards probability sampling and other hybrid methods.
When conducting a survey, canvassers can interview subjects face-to-face, either
by intercepting them on the street or by visiting sampled households. The unit costs of
face-to-face interviewing can be quite high, especially if attempts to create a geograph-
ically representative sample are made. For this reason, the polling industry abandoned
this method and embraced telephone-based surveys. The phone numbers of respon-
dents could be drawn at random from a telephone directory. However, to avoid any
sample biases arising from the systematic exclusion of households with unlisted phone
numbers, pollsters tend to use random digit dialing systems. Random digit dialing is
employed by major American polling organizations in their presidential election polls
(Voss, Gelman, and King (1995)). The results of recent research indicate that this
technique may be soon superseded by the more cost-effective and reliable method of
sampling from the voter registration lists (Green and Gerber (2006)).
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The accuracy of survey-based projections may depend on multiple factors, such
as sampling procedure, number of respondents, or correct identification of likely non-
voters. With their reputation at stake, pollsters are motivated to reduce the margin
of error by applying the best techniques at their disposal, especially in the case of
widely followed national elections. For this reason, the major pre-election surveys have
enjoyed a reasonably good track record ever since scientific polling was adopted. It can
be calculated from the data released by the National Council on Public Polls (NCPP)
that the average absolute candidate error for all major U.S. presidential polls between
1936 and 2000 was 2.32%.3
Election forecasting also embraces techniques other than polling. For instance,
one could make use of the fact that election outcomes tend to correlate with macroe-
conomic variables (Kramer (1971), Grier and McGarrity (1998)). This correlation is
observed because many voters assess economic conditions retrospectively and hold in-
cumbents accountable for the efficacy of their policies. Fair (1978) formalized this
intuition by deriving a model which links the share of two-party vote to such factors
as GDP growth and inflation. He made subsequent updates of his vote equation and
provided forecasts for presidential elections (Fair (1982), Fair (1988), Fair (1996), Fair
(2002)).4 The ex-post within-sample prediction of Fair’s model has been correct with
respect to the election winner in all but three presidential races held since 1916. The
average absolute error of the out-of-sample forecasts in the ten elections starting from
1964 equaled 2.58% (Fair (2004)).
In general, rational investors will strive to assess voter sentiment using all avail-
able sources of information, such as polls, macroeconomic data, electoral debates, or
media reports. In an efficient market, their expectations will be aggregated into a con-
sensus forecast, and stock prices will move to reflect it. A wealth of empirical evidence
on how markets aggregate expectations of individual traders comes from prediction
markets5 like the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM).6 These markets are operated by the
faculty of Tippie College of Business at the University of Iowa and allow individuals
to stake their money on future election results.
3 See the report of O’Neill, Mitofsky, and Taylor (2001).
4 Ray C. Fair makes available all updates on his Yale web site at http://fairmodel.econ.yale.
edu/.
5 For an introduction to types, functioning, and applications of prediction markets the interested
reader is referred to Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004).
6 For an illuminating overview of historical presidential betting markets in the U.S. during the
1868–1940 era see Rhode and Strumpf (2004).
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The IEM is essentially a futures market where trading can be conducted over
the Internet on a 24-hours-per-day basis. Different types of contracts are listed. In
the presidential vote-share market, the contracts’ liquidation payoff is a dollar multiple
of the popular vote percentage received by a given candidate. In the winner-takes-all
market, contracts are defined as digital options with a payoff of $1 conditional on a
particular candidate winning the election. The design of the instruments traded on the
IEM allows the expected election outcome to be easily extracted from the prevailing
market prices.7
Prior research has documented that, although individual traders in the IEM show
an inclination to overestimate the chances of their preferred candidate and often con-
duct suboptimal transactions, the market in aggregate is an exceptionally accurate
predictor of the election result (Forsythe, Rietz, and Ross (1999), Oliven and Rietz
(2004)). The efficiency of market prices seems to be assured by marginal traders who
arbitrage away any existing judgment biases and pricing errors. The prices of contracts
are a much better guide to the future than polls. An analysis of 15 national elections in
six different countries performed by Berg, Forsythe, Nelson, and Rietz (2005) reveals
that the absolute error of polls in the week before the election was 1.93%, compared
with a 1.58% average market error. Furthermore, the IEM outperformed over 70% of
the long-horizon forecasts generated by polling organizations (Berg, Nelson, and Rietz
(2003)). New opinion-poll results did not drive the market prices and were merely
a confirmation of the traders’ collective knowledge (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, and
Wright (1992)).
The preceding discussion characterizes a broad spectrum of techniques and infor-
mation that can be used to evaluate the mood of the electorate. The extant evidence
indicates that reasonably accurate predictions of voters’ behavior can be formed, but
whether stock market participants are surprised by the ultimate election outcome re-
mains an open empirical question.
3.3 Methodology
We gauge the impact of elections on the second moment of return distribution using a
volatility event-study approach. The analysis starts with isolating the country-specific
7 More information about the structure of the IEM can be found at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/
iem/.
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component of variance within a GARCH(1,1) framework.8 An international market
model9 is formalized as follows:
Ri,t = α + βR
∗
t + εi,t, εi,t ∼ N(0, hi,t), (3.1)
hi,t = γ0 + γ1hi,t−1 + γ2ε2i,t−1, (3.2)
where Ri,t and R
∗
t are the continuously compounded returns on the U.S. dollar denom-
inated stock market index in country i and the global stock market index on day t,
respectively. εi,t denotes the country-specific part of index returns, and hi,t stands for
its conditional volatility.10,11
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) are estimated jointly using the Maximum Likelihood
(ML) method over a period immediately preceding the event window. The convention
adopted in the literature for the type of event studies described by Brown and Warner
(1985) is to use 250 daily returns to estimate the benchmark model. One year of daily
observations, however, may be insufficient to accurately model GARCH processes, and
a longer estimation window is called for. On the other hand, the use of an over-
expansive window will substantially cut the number of elections that can be included
in our sample. Guided by these practical considerations and the results of Hwang and
Valls Pereira (2006), we have decided to choose an estimation period of 500 trading
days.
To measure abnormal volatility, one has to consider the variation in εi,t around
the event date in relation to its regular non-event level. The GARCH model may serve
as a benchmark, as it can provide an indication of what the volatility would have been,
had the election not occurred. A word of caution, however, is required. As it stands,
Equation (3.2) is a one-step-ahead forecast and will not generate an event-independent
projection. The immediate impact of an election, as measured by εi,0, will have a
8 The parsimonious GARCH(1,1) specification is in accord with previous volatility event studies
(Hilliard and Savickas (2002)). Moreover, this parameterization has been found to exhibit the best fit
and forecast accuracy (Akgiray (1989)).
9 As a reference see Stehle (1977), for example.
10 Given the assumption of normality for the GARCH(1,1) residuals, the distribution of the test
statistic under the null hypothesis of zero cumulative abnormal volatility (Equation (3.7)) will be
chi-square (Hilliard and Savickas (2002)). We agree with these authors that modelling GARCH(1,1)
in which the conditional distribution of residuals is Student-t would be an interesting direction for
further research and help accommodate the often empirically observed leptokurtosis of GARCH(1,1)
residuals. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
11 The incorporation of trading volume into the setting of this investigation would be a possible
extension since price (return) and quantity (volume) are determined simultaneously and volume can
also serve as an ex-post indicator of uncertainty (Karpoff (1986), Grundy and McNichols (1989), Kim
and Verrecchia (1991), Harris and Raviv (1993)). However, volume data are unavailable in Datastream
for the breadth and length of our sample.
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bearing on the values of hi,t for any t > 0. This issue can be easily resolved by making
the volatility forecast12 conditional only on the information set available prior to the
event. For this reason, the volatility benchmark for the k-th day of the event window is
defined as a k-step-ahead forecast of the conditional variance based on the information
set available on the last day of the estimation window t∗:
E
[
hi,t∗+k|Ωt∗
]
= γˆ0
k−1∑
j=0
(γˆ1 + γˆ2)
j + (γˆ1 + γˆ2)
k−1γˆ1hi,t∗ + (γˆ1 + γˆ2)k−1γˆ2εˆ2i,t∗ . (3.3)
The distribution of the residuals during the event window can be described as
εi,t ∼ N
(
ARt,Mt · E
[
hi,t|Ωt∗
])
, where Mt is the multiplicative effect of the event
on volatility, ARt is the event-induced abnormal return, and t > t
∗. Under the null
hypothesis that investors are not surprised by election outcomes, the value of parameter
Mt should equal one. Note that, if the residuals were demeaned using the cross-section
average, they would be normally distributed with zero mean. Their variance, under
the assumption of residual orthogonality, would be
V ar
[
εi,t − 1
N
N∑
i=1
εi,t
]
=Mt
[
E
[
hi,t|Ωt∗
]N − 2
N
+
1
N2
N∑
j=1
E
[
hj,t|Ωt∗
]]
=Mt · EIDRVi,t,
(3.4)
where EIDRVi,t stands for the event-independent demeaned residual variance and N
is the number of events included in the sample.
Since the objective of the study is to quantify the effect of elections on stock
market volatility, Mt is the parameter of primary interest. The method of estimating
this event-induced volatility multiple rests on combining residual standardization with
a cross-sectional approach in the spirit of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991)
and Hilliard and Savickas (2002). Note that the estimate Mˆt can be calculated as the
cross-sectional variance of demeaned residuals, standardized by the event-independent
demeaned residual standard deviation [EIDRVi,t]
1/2:
Mˆt =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
N · εˆi,t −
∑N
j=1 εˆj,t
)2
N · (N − 2) · E[hi,t|Ωt∗]+∑Nj=1E[hi,t|Ωt∗] , (3.5)
where εˆi,t = Ri,t − (αˆ+ βˆR∗t ) and t > t∗.
Under the null hypothesis, the demeaned standardized residuals follow a standard
normal distribution because Mt equals one. Consequently, the abnormal percentage
12 For extensive reviews of the recent work on volatility forecasting see Poon and Granger (2003),
Ederington and Guan (2005), or Andersen, Bollerslev, Christoffersen, and Diebold (2005).
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change in volatility on any day t of the event window is (Mˆt−1). For an event window
(n1, n2), the cumulative abnormal volatility (CAV ) can be calculated as
CAV (n1, n2) =
( n2∑
t=n1
Mˆt
)− (n2 − n1 + 1). (3.6)
In the current setting, the null hypothesis of no impact can be expressed in the
following way:
H0 : CAV (n1, n2) = 0, (3.7)
which is equivalent to
H0 :
n2∑
t=n1
Mt(N − 1) = (n2 − n1 + 1) · (N − 1). (3.8)
Since, under the null,Mt is a variance ofN independentN(0, 1) random variables,
Mˆt(N − 1) ∼ χ2N−1 and
∑n2
t=n1
Mˆt(N − 1) ∼ χ2(N−1)·(n2−n1+1). The test statistic for the
hypothesis stated in Equation (3.7) is therefore
φ(n1, n2) =
n2∑
t=n1
(N − 1) · Mˆt ∼ χ2(N−1)·(n2−n1+1). (3.9)
The inferences based on the theoretical test will not be robust if the assumptions
of the underlying econometric model are violated. Potential complications may arise
from non-normality, cross-sectional dependence, or autocorrelation of the regression
residuals εi,t. To circumvent these problems and reinforce our results, the statistical
significance of the election impact is additionally tested using the bootstrap methodol-
ogy of Efron (1979). More specifically, the cumulative abnormal volatility during the
election period is compared with the empirical distribution of CAV s simulated under
the null hypothesis. The iterative procedure for generating the empirical distribution
can be described as follows:
1. From the entire set of available countries and dates, randomly draw with re-
placement N country/date combinations to match the number of elections in the
original sample.
2. Compute the cumulative abnormal volatility using Equation (3.6) for the ran-
domly generated sample over the respective event window.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 5,000 times and sort the collection of resulting CAV s in an
ascending order to obtain the empirical distribution. The p-value can be defined
as the number of bootstrapped CAV s that exceed the CAV calculated for the
original election sample, divided by the number of replications (i.e. 5,000).
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The changes in volatility are also linked to election and country characteristics
by means of regression analysis. This inquiry closely follows the approach of Dubofsky
(1991) and Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg (2005) in that the dependent variable is
defined as the natural logarithm of the pre-event and event window volatility ratio.
The application of the log transformation to the variance quotient reduces the skew-
ness of the underlying data and thereby leads to more reliable t-statistics. The test
statistics and parameter standard errors are estimated using the heteroskedasticity-
consistent method of White (1980). A description of the independent variables used in
the regressions follows in Subsection 3.4.
3.4 Data
In an attempt to create a broad international sample, the author compiled information
on 27 industrialized nations. This includes all OECD countries, with the exception of
Iceland, Luxembourg, and Slovakia.13 As of the time of writing this chapter, Morgan
Stanley Capital International Inc. (MSCI) did not provide data on stock market indices
for these three capital markets. The returns for the remaining countries were computed
using the U.S. dollar denominated MSCI Country Indices. These are value-weighted
and adjusted for dividend payments. We have further chosen the MSCI World Index,
which measures the performance of all developed equity markets, as a proxy for our
global portfolio. The stock market data are sourced from Thomson Financial Datas-
tream.
[Insert Table 3.1 here]
Table 3.1 summarizes some important facts about the 27 countries and 134 elec-
tions14 included in our sample. As can be seen from the table, we distinguish between
countries where parliamentary elections are assumed to be the relevant events and
countries where presidential elections are investigated instead. This distinction is cru-
cial since we combine a panel of countries with heterogeneous political systems and
diverse constitutional features. In states with a presidential system of government, a
13 This results in 21 developed markets (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, U.S.) and 6 emerging markets (Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico,
Poland, Turkey). Or, put differently, 20 countries are located in the European region, 4 in the Asia-
Pacific region, and 3 in the Americas.
14 Concerning their distribution, 96 elections are clustered in Europe, 24 in the Asia-Pacific region,
and 14 on the American continent.
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President holds the positions of both head of state and head of government. Countries
with presidential systems include the United States, Mexico, and South Korea. Most
of the countries in our sample, however, operate under parliamentary systems with a
Premier or Prime Minister as the head of government, and a President or Monarch as
the, sometimes merely symbolic, head of state. Since our intention is to investigate the
volatility around those elections that determine the formation of national governments,
we have to focus on presidential elections in presidential systems and parliamentary
elections in parliamentary systems.
Column 3 of Table 3.1 indicates the date from which daily observations on the
respective MSCI Country Indices can be downloaded from Datastream. For several
countries, monthly observations became available prior to the dates reported in Ta-
ble 3.1. It has to be noted, however, that monthly sampling frequency is too low for
the purposes of our inquiry. While the indices for most of the developed markets start
around January 1980, other countries do not have these data available until the end of
the 1980s or even the beginning of the 1990s. In some cases, this can quite heavily cut
the number of elections that qualify for inclusion in our sample. The relative paucity of
data in the time-series dimension vividly highlights the merits of a large cross-section.
Election dates were mostly obtained from Lane, McKay, and Newton (1997),
Caramani (2000), and Banks, Muller, and Overstreet (2004). To double-check the
integrity of these data, we conducted extensive newspaper and internet searches. For
any given country, the date of the first election included is solely determined by the
MSCI index starting date. Elections that took place in the first 500 trading days after
the index starting date, however, had to be excluded from the sample. This restriction
enables us to estimate the volatility benchmark model given in Equations (3.1) and (3.2)
for all of the events considered. The date of the last election included (column 5)
corresponds to the last election that took place before the end of 2004.
Column 6 reports the total number of elections for each of the countries. The
maximum of nine elections for Australia can be explained by the early availability of
index data for this country, combined with a relatively short election cycle of only
three years and a considerable number of early elections. The minimum of only one
observation is linked to Greece, which has the shortest MSCI index series. For four
countries, only two elections can be included. Among these are the Eastern European
emerging markets of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, where stock exchanges
were only re-established after the fall of communism at the beginning of the 1990s, and
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Mexico, where the first election that met international standards of democracy and
transparency was not held until 1994.
To pinpoint the determinants of election-induced volatility, we have constructed
a comprehensive data set of explanatory variables. These variables are meant to pro-
vide further insights into the political, institutional, and socio-economic factors which
could influence the magnitude of election shocks (see, for example, Alesina, Roubini,
and Cohen (1997), Pantzalis, Stangeland, and Turtle (2000), and Beck, Clarke, Groff,
Keefer, and Walsh (2001)). More specifically, the following explanatory variables are
considered:
1. Parliamentary (dummy variable) captures the difference between parliamentary
and presidential systems.
2. Minority Government (dummy variable) indicates elections in which a minority
government—i.e., a cabinet in a parliamentary system that does not represent a
majority of seats in parliament—is brought to office.
3. Margin of Victory is defined as the difference between the percentage of pop-
ular votes obtained by government coalition and opposition for parliamentary
elections, and the corresponding difference between winner and runner-up for
presidential races.
4. Number of Parties indicates the number of independent political parties involved
in the government coalition for parliamentary systems. It takes a value of 1 for
presidential systems.
5. ∆Orientation (dummy variable) indicates a change in the political orientation of
the government, i.e., a shift from a left-wing to a right-wing government or vice
versa.15
6. Early Election (dummy variable) marks early elections, i.e., elections that were
called more than three months16 before the official end of the term of the incum-
bent administration, as set at the beginning of the government’s tenure.17
15 The classification of governments into a left-wing/right-wing scheme is, of course, far from being
uncontroversial and may be deemed subjective. Therefore, we stick closely to the conventions adopted
in Alt (1985), Alesina and Roubini (1992), and Banks, Muller, and Overstreet (2004).
16 This is in line with Pantzalis, Stangeland, and Turtle (2000). Alternative specifications classified
elections as “early” whenever they took place more than six or twelve months before the official end of
the term. Changes in the definition of this variable, however, did not substantially alter our empirical
findings.
17 A change in the timing of an election gives the market less time to analyze new information related
to the election, thus forcing market participants to revise and re-evaluate their expectations in a shorter
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7. Compulsory Voting (dummy variable) indicates countries with mandatory voting
laws.
8. Ln Population is the natural logarithm of total population in a given country-
year.
9. Ln GDP per Capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in a given country-
year, measured in constant 2000 US$.18
The last two variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators19
database compiled by the World Bank. The main sources considered and consolidated
for the construction of the political variables are Alesina and Roubini (1992), Laver
and Schofield (1998), Caramani (2000), Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001),
Naka (2002), Mu¨ller and Strøm (2003), and Banks, Muller, and Overstreet (2004).
The information on compulsory voting comes from a comprehensive archive of the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance20 (IDEA (2005)).
[Insert Table 3.2 here]
Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables introduced
above. Parliamentary elections account for 91.8% of our sample, and in almost one-
fourth of the cases, the winning government coalition does not have a majority of
seats in the parliament. In some countries (especially Denmark, Norway, and Sweden),
minority governments are the rule rather than exception (Mu¨ller and Strøm (2003)).
This observation may partially explain the negative average victory margin of −2.81%.
Another explanation that can be offered for this negative mean is that most countries in
our sample have incorporated majoritarian elements in their electoral systems, thereby
favoring parties with higher vote shares. This implies that a popular vote share of
less than 50% (obtained by either a single party or a multi-party coalition) is often
sufficient for a majority of seats in parliament. The data reported in Table 3.2 also
reveal that a median government coalition comprised two independent parties.
period of time (Pantzalis, Stangeland, and Turtle (2000)). This is consistent with manipulation by
the incumbent during policy-sensitive elections as noted by Harrington (1993).
18 For the last two variables, the log transformation is applied to reduce the skewness in the under-
lying data.
19 The data can be found at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/.
20 The International IDEA Voter Turnout Website, accessible at http://www.idea.int/vt/, con-
tains a global collection of political participation statistics.
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In almost one-third of the cases, a change in the orientation of the government
takes place, and 41.8% of the elections are called early. In some countries with endoge-
nous election timing, governments may regularly be tempted to call early elections
in order to exploit economic conditions which they judge more promising for their
re-election (Cargill and Hutchison (1991)). Six of the countries in our sample (Aus-
tralia, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Mexico, and Turkey) have mandatory voting laws, but
the stringency and enforcement of these laws appears to be country-specific. A non-
voter could, for instance, face a fine, restrictions on employment in the public sector
(Belgium), or difficulties in obtaining new identification documents (Greece). Finally,
the population of the countries included in our sample ranges from 3.4 million (New
Zealand 1990) to 294 million (United States 2004), whereas GDP per capita (measured
in constant 2000 US$) varies between US$ 2,471 (Turkey 1991) and US$ 38,222 (Japan
2003).
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Return Volatility around the Election Date
Our empirical investigation starts with the volatility event study described in the
methodology subsection. For the purpose of our inquiry, we define the event day
as the Election Day, except for instances when elections took place during the weekend
or on a bank holiday. In these cases, day zero is defined as the first trading day after
the election. The first panel of Figure 3.1 depicts the behavior of cumulative abnormal
volatility around the vote-casting periods. The theoretical and bootstrap p-values for
the null hypothesis of no increase in country-specific variance are plotted in the second
and third panel. Both probabilities are truncated at 20%.
[Insert Figure 3.1 here]
The plot depicted in Figure 3.1 clearly demonstrates that elections are accompa-
nied by elevated volatility. A strong abnormal rise starts on Election Day and continues
for a number of days thereafter. This prolonged reaction is most probably due to the
fact that the official results may not be released until several days after the elections.
The process of counting special votes21 and possible recounts can substantially add to
21 The term “special votes” is used here in relation to votes cast by individuals who, due to certain
circumstances, are unable to get to the required polling place on Election Day. This could, for instance,
be the case when the registered voter is outside her electorate, is seriously ill or hospitalized, or her
name was mistakenly omitted from the electoral roll.
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this delay. Furthermore, some of the abnormal volatility observed in the later days
of the event window may also be attributed to ongoing coalition talks or statements
issued by the newly elected authorities.
[Insert Table 3.3 here]
It can be seen from Table 3.3 that CAV (−25, 25) reaches a value of 11.94. At
first glance, this value may have little intuitive content. An astute reader, however,
will realize that the ratio of CAV to the total number of days included in the event
window is, by construction, equal to the percentage increase of the volatility relative to
its benchmark. This means that, in the 51 days surrounding the elections, the country-
specific component of variance was 23.42% higher than it would have been, had the
elections not occurred. Narrowing the event window leads to larger implied percentage
changes, confirming that most of the large stock market moves are concentrated around
Election Day. The punch line of Table 3.3 is that the country-specific return volatility
can easily double in the week around elections.
Figure 3.1 shows the probabilities for the null of no abnormal reaction in volatility.
The probabilities drop to nearly zero immediately after the event date. This result is
corroborated in Table 3.3 where, at the precision of four decimal places, most of the
p-values are indistinguishable from zero. Regardless of the testing methodology, the
null is rejected for all of the considered event windows at the 1% significance level or
better. There are slight differences between the p-values produced by the theoretical
and bootstrap approaches. The latter can be deemed more reliable, as it does not
assume normality and independence of returns. Overall, very compelling evidence is
found that the country-specific component of variance increases dramatically around
the event date.
3.5.2 Determinants of Election Surprise
We proceed further by attempting to link the magnitude of election shocks to several
explanatory variables by means of regression analysis. Following the approach adopted
in prior literature (Dubofsky (1991), Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg (2005)), we
define the dependent variable as a natural logarithm of the volatility ratio. This ratio is
constructed by dividing the return variance computed over the (−25, 25) event window
by the variance of returns in a pre-event window of equal length, i.e. (−76,−26).
To check the sensitivity of the regression estimates to the addition of new independent
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variables, several specifications were tried, and the results are reported in Table 3.4. As
can be seen from the table, the Margin of Victory and Minority Government variables
are not bundled together into one equation in order to avoid potential multicollinearity
problems. There is a strong negative correlation between these variables of almost
−0.5, which is induced by the fact that minority governments typically have a negative
margin of victory.
[Insert Table 3.4 here]
Table 3.4 reveals that the increase in variance is more pronounced for closely
contested races. Whenever picking the probable winner is difficult, uncertainty will
not resolve fully until the official release of election results. Investors also tend to react
in a more volatile manner when the new government coalition does not hold a majority
of seats in parliament. This could be, for instance, because the implementation of
new policies by minority governments is usually a very arduous task. A change in
the political orientation of the executive also adds to the volatility of stock prices, as
investors anticipate new directions in economic and redistribution policies.
We find evidence that mandatory voting reduces the election surprise. At least
two explanations can be propounded to explain this phenomenon. In the absence of
compulsory voting laws, individuals holding extreme political views will show an above-
average proclivity to vote and will be able to distort election outcomes. Furthermore,
the precision of pre-election polls will depend on whether the interviewers have correctly
determined which of the respondents are likely not to vote. Political preferences of
voters and non-voters may be quite different, which will bias the survey predictions
(Green and Gerber (2006)). With compulsory voting laws in place, both of the above-
mentioned problems are mitigated.
Although the remaining regressors lack significant explanatory power, the signs
of their coefficient estimates appear to be uncontroversial. The jump in volatility
is, ceteris paribus, greater for presidential races and in cases when the elections are
called early. Formation of wide government coalitions comprising a large number of
independent parties can further aggravate the stock market fluctuations. Finally, there
seems to be less uncertainty about election outcomes in countries with large population
and high GDP per capita, as numerous and aﬄuent nations can allocate more resources
to pre-election polling.
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3.6 Robustness Checks
The event study presented in the previous subsection focusses on the country-specific
component of volatility. An obvious extension of this analysis would be to investigate
the behavior of total variance, which is influenced by both domestic and international
developments. Table 3.5 reports the average unconditional variances computed for
different time intervals around the elections. These figures are subsequently compared
with the estimates of average variances from the pre-event windows of equal length.
The evidence indicates that a marked increase in unconditional volatility takes place
around the election date. Wilcoxon signed-rank (Wilcoxon (1945)) and Fisher (Fisher
(1932)) tests are employed to affirm the statistical significance of this increase. Whereas
the former has frequently been applied in the literature, to the best knowledge of the
author there has not been a single application of the Fisher test in the event-study
context as of yet. Consequently, some words of clarification are in order.
The design of the Fisher test has been inspired by the work of Fisher (1932) and
Maddala and Wu (1999). The null hypothesis for this test can be written as
H0 : Event Variancei = Pre-Event Variancei for all i, (3.10)
against the alternative
H1 : Event Variancei > Pre-Event Variancei
for a significant fraction of i,
(3.11)
where i = 1, . . . , N denotes the event subscript. Essentially, the null is a composite
hypothesis because it impartsN sub-hypotheses. One could test the variance constancy
for each i using a simple F -test, and the significance level pi could be obtained. It
follows that, under the null, −2 ln(pi) is χ2 distributed with two degrees of freedom
and the ultimate test statistic Fisher Test = −2∑Ni=1 ln(pi) has a χ2 distribution with
2N degrees of freedom.
[Insert Table 3.5 here]
Table 3.5 shows that, irrespective of the choice of the event window, both the
Wilcoxon signed-rank and Fisher tests strongly reject the hypothesis of variance con-
stancy. To illustrate the inflation in unconditional variance even further, we adopt a
simple rolling regression approach which can be described as follows. Given any fixed
day in the event window, we compute logged unconditional variances over the last 25
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trading days for every election included in our sample. These logged variances are
subsequently regressed against a constant term. This calculation is repeated for every
day in the event window and the regression constants are plotted in Figure 3.2. The
pattern that emerges strongly attests to the existence of election surprise.
[Insert Figure 3.2 here]
3.7 Implications for Investors
3.7.1 Compensation for Risk
It is commonsensical to expect increased return variability during periods of political
change. It is, however, less obvious whether investors are adequately compensated for
taking this political risk. To address this question, we conduct a simple event-study
analysis (see, e.g., Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997)). We define abnormal returns
(AR) as the difference between returns on the election country stock market index and
the global index. The abnormal returns are subsequently averaged across all events
and cumulated over the relevant event window (n1, n2) to obtain an estimate of cumu-
lative abnormal return
(
CAR(n1, n2)
)
. The statistical significance of CAR(n1, n2) is
evaluated using the following t-statistic:
t
(
CAR(n1, n2)
)
=
CAR(n1, n2)√
(n2 − n1 + 1) · ˆV ar(ARt)
, (3.12)
where ˆV ar(ARt) is the estimate of variance of the average abnormal returns computed
in the time-series dimension. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic in Equation
(3.12) follows a t-distribution with 499 degrees of freedom (see Brown and Warner
(1985)), which can be approximated sufficiently accurately by a standard normal dis-
tribution.
The magnitude of CARs reported in Table 3.6 and plotted in Figure 3.3 does not
seem excessive. The additional compensation to an investor who is prepared to abandon
a strategy of international diversification and invest all of her money in countries facing
elections is about 33 basis points in the (−25, 25) event window.22 None of the reported
CARs in Table 3.6 is statistically significant, and several estimates for shorter sub-
periods are negatively signed. Although the reported risk premiums appear quite
22 The positively signed estimate is consistent with the uncertain information hypothesis (UIH) of
Brown, Harlow, and Tinic (1988) who note that as uncertainty is reduced, price changes tend to be
positive on average.
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modest, they would provide an adequate compensation if the average level of investors’
risk aversion was sufficiently low.
Given certain assumptions, it can be shown23 that a representative investor with
constant relative risk aversion will be content with the risk compensation offered by
the market if her relative risk-aversion (RRA) coefficient γ(n1, n2) is below a certain
break-point level γB(n1, n2). If, on the other hand, γ(n1, n2) > γ
B(n1, n2), the optimal
decision for the investor will be to cease investing all of her money in countries awaiting
elections and pursue a strategy of international portfolio diversification. The parameter
γB(n1, n2) can be estimated from the underlying data as follows:
γˆB(n1, n2) = 1 + 2
CAR(n1, n2)
ˆV ar
[
R˜i(n1, n2)
]− ˆV ar[R˜∗(n1, n2)] , (3.13)
where R˜i(n1, n2) and R˜
∗(n1, n2) are the cumulative log returns on the election country
index and the global index, respectively. ˆV ar
[
R˜i(n1, n2)
]
and ˆV ar
[
R˜∗(n1, n2)
]
denote
the estimates of cross-sectional variances thereof.
[Insert Figure 3.3 here]
[Insert Table 3.6 here]
The task of drawing any generalized conclusions, at this stage, should be ap-
proached with great caution, especially given the fact that the literature does not
provide any consensus estimate of the average investors’ risk aversion. An analysis
of households’ asset composition by Friend and Blume (1975) reveals that the RRA
coefficient is slightly above two. Gertner (1993) examines risky decisions of contes-
tants on the television game show “Card Sharks” and reports a lower bound for the
risk-aversion estimate of 4.8. A similar study of the Dutch word game “Lingo” by
Beetsma and Schotman (2001) concludes that the parameter is close to seven. Last
but not least, the risk-aversion coefficient that is needed to explain the magnitude of
the historical equity premium in the United States is around 19 (Mehra and Prescott
(1985), Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997)).
The academic discussion on the risk attitudes of a representative agent is unlikely
to be settled in the near future. Our pragmatic recommendation for anyone who
considers investment in a country facing an election, however, would be to measure
their own RRA coefficient. This individual estimate should be subsequently compared
with the figures reported in the last column of Table 3.6 in order to determine the
23 For a rigorous derivation and proof see the Appendix in Subsection 3.9.
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optimal choice of strategy. It can be seen that an investment over the longest event
window requires a risk-aversion coefficient of less than 1.57. Furthermore, one would
have to exhibit risk-loving behavior to benefit from investments made on Election Day
and liquidated within the next two weeks. A robust conclusion that can be reached
is that everyone with an RRA coefficient greater than 4.21 should definitely avoid
investing all of their money in a country with upcoming elections. The compensation
for risk will, in this case, be incommensurate and the strategy of international portfolio
diversification will yield higher expected utility.
3.7.2 Option Pricing and Possible Trading Strategies
Savvy investors are likely to realize that the stock market tends to be mercurial in
nature during election periods. If they incorporate this information into their decision-
making, prices of financial options will move to reflect it. This nexus between option
market and political risk has not gone completely unnoticed in the literature. Gemmill
(1992) reports that, in the last two weeks of the British 1987 election campaign, im-
plied volatility of the FTSE 10024 options almost doubled. Sharp increases were also
observed for blue-chip companies that were likely to be re-nationalized if Labour won
the election. These results illustrate the strong interdependence between the spot and
option markets.
We check whether the findings of Gemmill (1992) can be reconfirmed in an inter-
national sample. The implied volatility indices are, however, unavailable for many of
the countries considered, and most of them have not been constructed until the turn of
this decade. The obtainable data permit an analysis of option market behavior around
15 elections25 in 11 countries.26 The time series are sourced from Thomson Financial
Datastream and an exact description of the sample composition can be found in Ta-
ble 3.7. Given the data at hand, an average implied volatility is computed across all
elections and plotted in Figure 3.4.
[Insert Table 3.7 here]
[Insert Figure 3.4 here]
24 FTSE is a British provider of stock market indices and was originally conceived as a joint venture
between the Financial Times (F-T) and London Stock Exchange (S-E).
25 Concerning their distribution, 10 elections are clustered in Europe, 2 in the Asia-Pacific region,
and 3 on the American continent.
26 This results in 8 developed markets (Austria, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland,
UK, U.S.) and 3 emerging markets (Czech Republic, Mexico, Poland).
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Figure 3.4 offers compelling evidence that options tend to be more expensive in
periods when voters cast their ballots. The average implied volatility jumps from 31.2%
five days before the election to 55.5% five days thereafter. Interestingly, not much of
the upward move is observed prior to the event. This may suggest that investors did not
anticipate the extent of their surprise on Election Day. As a consequence, strategies of
buying straddles and strangles prior to the elections could have proven quite lucrative
(see, e.g., Hull (2005)). Although a more extensive study would be needed to affirm the
profitability, our preliminary results indicate that these volatility-based option trading
strategies may have had some success in the past.
3.8 Summary and Conclusions
This study investigates the interplay between politics and finance by focussing on
stock market volatility around national elections. The value added of this chapter
is twofold. First, it provides a detailed examination of the second moment of index
return distribution around election dates. Since much of the uncertainty regarding
future government policies is resolved during balloting periods, the stock prices can
adjust dramatically and stock market volatility is likely to increase. To the best of the
author’s knowledge, it is the first study that rigorously quantifies the magnitude of this
increase. Second, we stretch the limits of earlier research by overcoming the commonly
used single-country approach and by introducing a new, extensive set of explanatory
variables.
The impact of elections on country-specific stock market volatility is assessed in
an event-study framework. Our empirical findings indicate that, despite many efforts
to accurately predict election outcomes, investors are still surprised by the ultimate
distribution of votes. Stock prices react strongly in response to this surprise, and
temporarily elevated levels of volatility are observed. These empirical conclusions hold
irrespective of the choice of event window. Narrowing the event window, however,
magnifies the implied percentage change in variance, suggesting that most of this hike
is due to large market moves on Election Day. We find that the country-specific
component of volatility can easily double during the week surrounding elections.
To track down the main determinants of election-induced volatility, we have com-
piled an encompassing data set of political, institutional, and socio-economic variables.
Four of the variables proved to influence the magnitude of election surprise in a signif-
CHAPTER 3. STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY AROUND NATIONAL ELECTIONS 56
icant way. Stock market participants tend to react in a more volatile manner during
closely contested races, when the outcome of the election brings about a change in the
political orientation of the government, and when governments do not secure parlia-
mentary majorities. In all of these cases, investors perceive increased uncertainty. On
the other hand, compulsory voting laws reduce the election shock. Enactment of such
laws leads to higher voter turnout, which improves the accuracy of pre-election surveys
and reduces the chances that the election outcome will be influenced by political fringe
groups.
Our empirical findings are robust to alternative ways of measuring excess volatil-
ity around Election Day. When examining the total variance rather than its country-
specific component, we still observe an evident jump. The statistical significance of this
increase is reconfirmed by both parametric and non-parametric tests. The link between
the magnitude of the election shock and the explanatory variables mentioned above
also seems to be uncontroversial since these variables retain their statistical significance
in alternative specifications of the regression equation.
The implications for investors are tangible and important. Risk-averse agents
require an adequate premium whenever they need to take on additional risks. Typical
investors are not fully diversified internationally, and it may occasionally happen that
they see all of their wealth invested in a country with upcoming elections. Therefore,
the investigation into whether investors are appropriately compensated for bearing
political risk associated with elections is crucial. It turns out that the premium offered
for the election risk is rather modest and acceptable only for investors with a relatively
low degree of risk aversion. All other investors will attain higher expected utility
by diversifying their portfolio internationally. Furthermore, we show that national
elections can be considered as important events by the participants of option markets.
In the heat of political changes, options tend to trade at higher implied volatilities.
In the light of the presented results, it becomes clear that the efforts to provide
more accurate pre-election forecasts should still be furthered. Improvements in fore-
casting precision will help to bridge the gap between actual investors’ requirements
and the current state of the art. With the emergence of accurate prediction markets,
however, one could envision that advances in this field can be achieved in the future.
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3.9 Appendix
A representative agent is assumed to invest all of her initial wealth Wn1 in risky assets.
The investment decision is made right now (time n1), and the portfolio composition will
remain unaltered until some future date n2 at which the investment will be liquidated.
The agent chooses to maximize the expectation of her constant relative risk-aversion
(CRRA) utility function
U(W˜n2) =
[
Wn1e
R˜(n1,n2)
](1−γ(n1,n2))
1− γ(n1, n2) , (3.14)
where R˜(n1, n2) is the cumulative, continuously compounded return on the portfolio
over the entire investment period and γ(n1, n2) is the agent’s relative risk-aversion
(RRA) coefficient
(
γ(n1, n2) 6= 1
)
. Note that, although the RRA coefficient is allowed
to vary across different investment horizons, for any fixed horizon it does not change
across different investment alternatives.
Given the normality of R˜(n1, n2), the expression for the expected utility of ter-
minal wealth can be derived using a formula for the expected value of log-normal
distribution:
E
[
U(W˜n2)
]
=
[
Wn1
](1−γ(n1,n2))[
e
](1−γ(n1,n2))E[R˜(n1,n2)]+ 12 (1−γ(n1,n2))2V ar[R˜(n1,n2)]
1− γ(n1, n2)
=
[
Wn1e
E[R˜(n1,n2)]+
1
2
(1−γ(n1,n2))V ar[R˜(n1,n2)]
](1−γ(n1,n2))
1− γ(n1, n2) .
(3.15)
Suppose further that elections are scheduled to take place in the agent’s home
country during her investment period (n1, n2). It is assumed for simplicity that the
agent can pursue only two mutually exclusive strategies. She could either invest do-
mestically or diversify her portfolio internationally. Her expected utility is influenced
by this choice of strategy as follows:
E
[
U(W˜n2)
]
=

[
Wn1e
E[R˜i(n1,n2)]+
1
2 (1−γ(n1,n2))V ar[R˜i(n1,n2)]
](1−γ(n1,n2))
1−γ(n1,n2) ,
domestic strategy;
[
Wn1e
E[R˜∗(n1,n2)]+ 12 (1−γ(n1,n2))V ar[R˜
∗(n1,n2)]
](1−γ(n1,n2))
1−γ(n1,n2) ,
international strategy;
(3.16)
where R˜i(n1, n2) and R˜
∗(n1, n2) denote the cumulative log return on the stock market
index in the election country and the cumulative log return on the global stock market
index, respectively.
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Whenever E
[
R˜i(n1, n2)
] 6= E[R˜∗(n1, n2)] and V ar[R˜i(n1, n2)] 6= V ar[R˜∗(n1, n2)],
the agent will be indifferent between the two investment alternatives if and only if her
risk-aversion coefficient γ(n1, n2) is equal to a break-point RRA coefficient γ
B(n1, n2),
such that
E
[
R˜i(n1, n2)
]
+
1
2
(
1− γB(n1, n2)
)
V ar
[
R˜i(n1, n2)
]
= E
[
R˜∗(n1, n2)
]
+
1
2
(
1− γB(n1, n2)
)
V ar
[
R˜∗(n1, n2)
]
.
(3.17)
Solving the above equation for γB(n1, n2) yields
γB(n1, n2) = 1 + 2
E
[
R˜i(n1, n2)
]− E[R˜∗(n1, n2)]
V ar
[
R˜i(n1, n2)
]− V ar[R˜∗(n1, n2)] . (3.18)
It can be shown that the agent’s optimal investment decision, in the presence
of election-induced volatility (i.e.
[
V ar
[
R˜i(n1, n2)
] − V ar[R˜∗(n1, n2)]] > 0), can be
described as
Optimal Strategy
(
γ(n1, n2)
)
=

invest domestically
if γ(n1, n2) < γ
B(n1, n2),
diversify internationally
if γ(n1, n2) > γ
B(n1, n2).
(3.19)
Equation (3.18) provides insights into the estimation of the break-point relative
risk-aversion coefficient γB(n1, n2) from the underlying data. Given that CAR(n1, n2) is
defined as cumulative excess return on the domestic market index over the international
one, the estimator of γB(n1, n2) can be written as
γˆB(n1, n2) = 1 + 2
CAR(n1, n2)
ˆV ar
[
R˜i(n1, n2)
]− ˆV ar[R˜∗(n1, n2)] , (3.20)
where ˆV ar
[
R˜i(n1, n2)
]
and ˆV ar
[
R˜∗(n1, n2)
]
denote the estimates of cross-sectional
variances of cumulative log returns on the domestic and global stock market indices,
respectively.
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3.10 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Cumulative Abnormal Volatility around Election Day
Note: The first panel plots the cumulative abnormal volatility around 134 national elections in 27
countries. The theoretical p-value shown in the second panel comes from a χ2 test for the null
hypothesis of no change in the country-specific component of volatility. The last panel depicts the
p-value based on the empirical distribution of cumulative abnormal volatilities generated using 5,000
bootstrap samples. Both the theoretical and bootstrap p-values are truncated at the 0.2 level.
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Figure 3.2: Rolling Regression Intercept
Note: Given any fixed day in the event window, logged unconditional variances over the last 25 trading
days are computed for 134 elections included in our sample. The logged variances are subsequently
regressed against a constant term. This calculation is repeated for every day in the event window,
and the constant is plotted in the graph above.
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative Abnormal Return around Election Day
Note: The abnormal returns are defined as the difference between returns on the election country
stock market index and the global index. The abnormal returns are subsequently averaged across all
134 elections and cumulated over the relevant event window. The resulting estimate of cumulative
abnormal return is plotted above.
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Figure 3.4: Average Implied Volatility around Election Day
Note: This figure plots the average of implied volatility indices around 15 national elections held in
11 countries.
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Table 3.1: Data Availability and Sample Composition
Election MSCI Index First Election Last Election Number of
Country Type Start Date Included Included Elections
Australia Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 05-Mar-83 09-Oct-04 9
Austria Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 24-Apr-83 24-Nov-02 7
Belgium Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 13-Oct-85 18-May-03 6
Canada Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 04-Sep-84 28-Jun-04 6
Czech Republic Parliamentary 04-Jan-94 20-Jun-98 14-Jun-02 2
Denmark Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 10-Jan-84 20-Nov-01 7
Finland Parliamentary 01-Jan-87 17-Mar-91 16-Mar-03 4
France Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 16-Mar-86 09-Jun-02 5
Germany Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 03-Mar-83 22-Sep-02 6
Greece Parliamentary 01-Jun-01 07-Mar-04 07-Mar-04 1
Hungary Parliamentary 02-Jan-95 10-May-98 07-Apr-02 2
Ireland Parliamentary 04-Jan-88 25-Nov-92 18-May-02 3
Italy Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 26-Jun-83 13-May-01 6
Japan Parliamentary 02-Jan-80 18-Dec-83 09-Nov-03 7
Korea Presidential 01-Jan-88 18-Dec-92 19-Dec-02 3
Mexico Presidential 01-Jan-88 21-Aug-94 02-Jul-00 2
Netherlands Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 08-Sep-82 22-Jan-03 7
New Zealand Parliamentary 02-Jan-87 27-Oct-90 27-Jul-02 5
Norway Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 08-Sep-85 10-Sep-01 5
Poland Parliamentary 01-Jan-93 21-Sep-97 23-Sep-01 2
Portugal Parliamentary 04-Jan-88 06-Oct-91 17-Mar-02 4
Spain Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 28-Oct-82 14-Mar-04 7
Sweden Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 19-Sep-82 15-Sep-02 7
Switzerland Parliamentary 02-Jan-80 23-Oct-83 19-Oct-03 6
Turkey Parliamentary 04-Jan-88 20-Oct-91 03-Nov-02 4
United Kingdom Parliamentary 01-Jan-80 09-Jun-83 07-Jun-01 5
United States Presidential 01-Jan-80 06-Nov-84 02-Nov-04 6
Total 134
Note: The first column lists all of the 27 OECD countries included in our sample. The relevant
type of election and the date from which daily stock prices for the respective MSCI Country Indices
became available in Datastream are given in the following two columns. For any given country, the
first election included is the earliest election that took place at least 500 trading days after the index
starting date. This sample selection requirement allows estimating the volatility benchmark model.
The date of the last election included corresponds to the most recent election that was held before
the end of 2004.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl.
Parliamentary 0.9179 0.2755 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Minority Government 0.2463 0.4325 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Margin of Victory −0.0281 0.2126 −0.1593 −0.0560 0.0592
Number of Parties 2.2015 1.2965 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000
∆Orientation 0.3209 0.4686 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Early Election 0.4179 0.4951 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Compulsory Voting 0.2090 0.4081 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ln Population 16.8395 1.1945 15.8873 16.5974 17.8599
Ln GDP per Capita 9.7472 0.5781 9.5720 9.8729 10.0955
Note: Descriptive statistics for a set of variables that are likely to influence election-induced volatility
are reported above: Mean, Standard Deviation, 25th, 50th (Median), and 75th Percentiles. The data
set consists of 134 elections held in 27 OECD countries. Parliamentary is a dummy variable which
takes a value of 1 for parliamentary elections and 0 for presidential elections. Minority Government
is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the government fails to hold a majority of seats in
parliament and 0 otherwise. Margin of Victory is defined as the difference between the percentage
of votes obtained by government and opposition for parliamentary elections and the corresponding
difference between winner and runner-up for presidential elections. Number of Parties denotes the
number of independent political parties involved in the government in parliamentary systems and
takes a value of 1 for presidential systems. ∆Orientation is a dummy variable which takes a value of
1 for a change in the political orientation of the government and 0 otherwise. Early Election takes a
value of 1 when elections are called before time and 0 otherwise. Compulsory Voting takes a value of 1
if a given country has mandatory voting laws and 0 otherwise. Ln Population and Ln GDP per Capita
are the natural logarithms of total population and GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$) in a given
country-year, respectively.
CHAPTER 3. STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY AROUND NATIONAL ELECTIONS 65
Table 3.3: Cumulative Abnormal Volatility around Election Day
Implied Percentage Theoretical Bootstrap
Event Window CAV (n1, n2) Change p-Value p-Value
Panel A: Symmetric Event Windows
(−2, 2) 5.3675 107.3500 0.0000 0.0016
(−5, 5) 6.8504 62.2764 0.0000 0.0026
(−10, 10) 7.9387 37.8033 0.0000 0.0048
(−25, 25) 11.9437 23.4190 0.0000 0.0076
Panel B: Asymmetric Event Windows
(0, 2) 5.3655 268.2750 0.0000 0.0000
(0, 5) 6.6115 132.2300 0.0000 0.0000
(0, 10) 7.2652 72.6520 0.0000 0.0018
(0, 25) 8.6725 34.6900 0.0000 0.0054
Note: The data set consists of 134 elections held in 27 OECD countries. Panel A of the table reports
cumulative abnormal volatility (CAV ) in windows centered on Election Day, whereas Panel B reports
the results for asymmetric event windows. The implied percentage change in country-specific volatility
relative to the benchmark is reported in the third column. Theoretical p-values come from a χ2 test
for the null hypothesis of no change in country-specific volatility. The last column reports bootstrap
p-values obtained from the empirical distribution of CAV s developed under the null, using 5,000
iterations.
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Table 3.4: Determinants of Excess Volatility
Expected Model Model Model Model Model
Variable Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.1143∗ 0.1594 0.0526 0.0029 1.8998
(0.0688) (0.2385) (0.2449) (0.2495) (1.8072)
Margin of Victory − −0.6697∗∗ −0.6793∗∗ −0.7462∗∗ −0.7702∗∗
(0.3300) (0.3411) (0.3527) (0.3538)
Parliamentary −0.0494 −0.2115 −0.1713 −0.2990
(0.2528) (0.2740) (0.2719) (0.3414)
Early Election + 0.0892 0.1376 0.1003
(0.1403) (0.1418) (0.1478)
∆Orientation + 0.3229∗∗ 0.3805∗∗∗ 0.2997∗∗
(0.1430) (0.1431) (0.1482)
Compulsory Voting − −0.3145∗∗ −0.2176 −0.3651∗∗
(0.1550) (0.1556) (0.1701)
Number of Parties + 0.0811 0.0397 0.0933
(0.0582) (0.0552) (0.0578)
Minority Government + 0.2675∗
(0.1608)
Ln Population − −0.0356
(0.0679)
Ln GDP per Capita − −0.1213
(0.1221)
Adjusted R2 2.56% 1.85% 6.08% 4.93% 5.52%
Note: This table presents results of regressions linking election-induced volatility to several explana-
tory variables. The dependent variable is a natural logarithm of the volatility ratio, defined as a
quotient of the return variance computed over the (−25, 25) event window and the variance of returns
in a pre-event window of equal length, i.e. (−76,−26). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
of White (1980) are given in parentheses. The data set consists of 134 elections held in 27 OECD
countries. Margin of Victory is defined as the difference between the percentage of votes obtained
by government and opposition for parliamentary elections and the corresponding difference between
winner and runner-up for presidential elections. Parliamentary is a dummy variable which takes a
value of 1 for parliamentary elections and 0 for presidential elections. Early Election takes a value of
1 when elections are called before time and 0 otherwise. ∆Orientation is a dummy variable which
takes a value of 1 for a change in the political orientation of the government and 0 otherwise. Com-
pulsory Voting takes a value of 1 if a given country has mandatory voting laws and 0 otherwise.
Number of Parties denotes the number of independent political parties involved in the government
in parliamentary systems and takes a value of 1 for presidential systems. Minority Government is a
dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the government fails to hold a majority of seats in par-
liament and 0 otherwise. Ln Population and Ln GDP per Capita are the natural logarithms of total
population and GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$) in a given country-year, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Change in Unconditional Variance
Event Event Pre-Event Pre-Event Percentage Wilcoxon Signed- Fisher
Window Variance Window Variance Change Rank Test Test
Panel A: Symmetric Event Windows
(−2, 2) 0.0166 (−7,−3) 0.0104 58.8283 2.9081∗∗∗ 397.54∗∗∗
(−5, 5) 0.0165 (−16,−6) 0.0112 47.9641 5.4088∗∗∗ 498.43∗∗∗
(−10, 10) 0.0159 (−31,−11) 0.0132 20.6038 2.9015∗∗∗ 559.09∗∗∗
(−25, 25) 0.0158 (−76,−26) 0.0138 14.2509 2.3107∗∗ 908.30∗∗∗
Panel B: Asymmetric Event Windows
(0, 2) 0.0138 (−3,−1) 0.0068 103.4263 2.8460∗∗∗ 388.73∗∗∗
(0, 5) 0.0166 (−6,−1) 0.0106 56.1312 3.4234∗∗∗ 418.39∗∗∗
(0, 10) 0.0164 (−11,−1) 0.0123 33.5528 3.9053∗∗∗ 451.58∗∗∗
(0, 25) 0.0161 (−26,−1) 0.0134 20.1656 2.8748∗∗∗ 610.43∗∗∗
Note: This table reports the change in unconditional variance calculated for 134 elections held in
27 OECD countries. Panel A of the table reports unconditional variances in windows centered on
Election Day, whereas Panel B reports the results for asymmetric event windows. In any row of
the table, the event and pre-event windows have equal length. The event and pre-event variance
denote the geometric averages of the unconditional variance estimators computed for all elections.
The fifth column reports the percentage increase in average unconditional variance relative to its pre-
event level. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic follows a standard normal distribution under the
null hypothesis of no change in variance. Given the validity of the null, the Fisher test statistic is
χ2 distributed with 268 degrees of freedom. ∗∗∗ and ∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 1% and
5% level, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Election Day
Event Window CAR(n1, n2) in % t-Statistic p-Value RRA Coefficient
Panel A: Symmetric Event Windows
(−2, 2) 0.2283 0.4865 0.6274 3.9980
(−5, 5) 0.5480 0.9937 0.3221 4.2057
(−10, 10) 0.1699 0.2580 0.7968 1.5848
(−25, 25) 0.3297 0.3456 0.7302 1.5696
Panel B: Asymmetric Event Windows
(0, 2) −0.2512 −0.9123 0.3632 −2.2143
(0, 5) −0.3187 −1.1960 0.2338 −0.7994
(0, 10) −0.3738 −1.1421 0.2555 −0.7150
(0, 25) 0.3182 0.4830 0.6299 1.9644
Note: This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) calculated around 134 elections held
in 27 OECD countries. Panel A of the table reports CARs in windows centered on Election Day,
whereas Panel B reports the results for asymmetric event windows. CAR is defined as the average
excess return on the election country index over the MSCI World Index, cumulated over time. The
t-statistics with the corresponding p-values are calculated for the null hypothesis of no compensation
for the election risk. The RRA coefficient denotes the break-point level of the constant relative risk-
aversion coefficient above which the strategy of international portfolio diversification yields higher
expected utility than the strategy of investing in election countries.
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Table 3.7: Implied Volatility Indices
Index First Election Last Election Number of
Country Datastream Code Start Date Included Included Elections
Austria ATXC.SERIESC 21-Jul-99 03-Oct-99 24-Nov-02 2
Czech Republic CTXC.SERIESC 16-Feb-00 14-Jun-02 14-Jun-02 1
France CACLC.SERIESC 05-Jan-00 09-Jun-02 09-Jun-02 1
Germany DAXC.SERIESC 19-Jul-99 22-Sep-02 22-Sep-02 1
Japan JPNC.SERIESC 10-Mar-00 25-Jun-00 09-Nov-03 2
Mexico MEXC.SERIESC 10-Mar-00 02-Jul-00 02-Jul-00 1
Netherlands EOEC.SERIESC 24-Aug-99 15-May-02 22-Jan-03 2
Poland PTXC.SERIESC 16-Feb-00 23-Sep-01 23-Sep-01 1
Switzerland SMIC.SERIESC 01-Mar-00 19-Oct-03 19-Oct-03 1
United Kingdom LSXC.SERIESC 05-Jan-00 07-Jun-01 07-Jun-01 1
United States ISXC.SERIESC 11-Aug-99 07-Nov-00 02-Nov-04 2
Total 15
Note: The first column lists all of the 11 sample countries that have implied volatility indices available
in Datastream. The second column provides the relevant Datastream code, and the third one indicates
the series starting date. The dates of the first and last election included as well as the total number
of elections for each of the sample countries are reported in the following columns.
Chapter 4
Institutional Investors and Stock
Market Efficiency
4.1 A Decreasing January Effect and the Impact of
Institutional Investors
4.1.1 Motivation and Literature Review
Since the late 1970s, researchers have discovered several seasonal patterns in stock re-
turns that constitute a challenge to the efficient markets hypothesis (Fama (1970)).
Regularities in stock returns or stock market anomalies comprise, among many oth-
ers, the January effect, the Monday seasonal, and the size effect. In this chapter,
we focus on the following aspect of stock market anomalies: If stock returns exhibit
exploitable regularities, then smart traders are expected to take advantage of these
patterns, thereby earning abnormal profits. Consequently, on stock markets with a
sufficiently large number of smart traders, anomalies are supposed to disappear as the
trading of this investor group arbitrages away seasonal patterns in stock returns.
Recent empirical findings suggest that institutional investors play the role of
smart traders on stock markets and, therefore, may have an impact on stock market
anomalies. Institutional investors can be characterized as informed traders who speed
up the adjustment of stock prices to new information, thereby rendering the stock
market more efficient. Institutions can obtain an informational advantage by exploiting
economies of scale in information acquisition and processing. The marginal costs of
gathering and processing information are lower for institutional than for individual
traders. In addition, institutional investors may be better trained and have superior
resources than individual investors. Moreover, for many years it has been common
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practice of companies to inform securities analysts in advance about company-specific
news, and only recently regulatory measures have been launched (namely the SEC’s
Regulation FD1) to prevent this habit. Hence, institutional investors’ trading decisions
may be stronger information-driven than those of individual investors.
Dennis and Weston (2001) support this view by providing evidence for U.S. stock
exchanges that institutions are better informed than individual investors. Cohen, Gom-
pers, and Vuolteenaho (2002) show that institutional investors push stock prices to-
wards their fundamental values by exploiting individual traders’ sentiment. Following
Barber and Odean (2008), individual investors display attention-based buying behav-
ior, whereas institutions do not exhibit this kind of non-fundamental trading pattern.
The impact of institutional trading on stock market anomalies has recently been
covered by three papers. Kamara (1997) and Chan, Leung, and Wang (2004) highlight
the role of institutional investors on the Monday seasonal. They present evidence for
U.S. stock markets that an increase in institutional ownership decreases the magnitude
of the Monday effect. Gompers and Metrick (2001) show that an increase in institu-
tional trading is partly responsible for the disappearance of Banz (1981)’ small stock
premium.2
In this study, we focus on the impact of institutional trading on a third major
anomaly, namely the January effect (Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Reinganum (1983),
Gultekin and Gultekin (1983), and Ritter (1988)).3 Two of the most prominent ex-
planations for the January effect refer to the specific trading behaviors of individual
and institutional investors. First, the tax-loss-selling hypothesis explains the January
anomaly with tax-motivated trading of individual investors. As the end of the year
approaches, individual investors sell stocks that declined in value in order to realize
tax losses. After the turn of the year they re-invest in these securities, which pushes
1 On August 15, 2000, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Regulation
FD to address the selective disclosure of information by publicly traded companies and other issuers.
Regulation FD provides that when an issuer discloses material nonpublic information to certain indi-
viduals or entities–generally, securities market professionals, such as stock analysts, or holders of the
issuer’s securities who may well trade on the basis of the information–the issuer must make public
disclosure of that information. In this way, the new rule aims to promote the full and fair disclosure.
2 Another strand of the finance literature views institutions as investors which induce non-
fundamental dynamics in stock returns due to their specific trading behavior. The main arguments
in this context are investment activities relying on herding, positive feedback trading, and window-
dressing strategies (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995),
Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Badrinath and Wahal (2002), and Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003)).
3 The January Effect refers to systematically higher stock market returns in January than in the
remaining months of the year. This anomaly should not be confused with what has become known as
the Other January Effect in the literature (see, e.g., Cooper, McConnell, and Ovtchinnikov (2006)):
the predictive power of January returns for market returns over the next 11 months of the year. The
Other January Effect is not the subject of this thesis.
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stock prices up (Ritter (1988)). Second, the window-dressing hypothesis suggests that
institutional investors’ portfolio rebalancing activities are responsible for the January
anomaly. Institutions are evaluated relative to their peers and, therefore, buy winners
and sell losers in order to present respectable year-end portfolio holdings (Lakonishok,
Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991)). The findings in Sias and Starks (1997) are favor-
able for the tax-loss-selling hypothesis and show that individual traders are primarily
responsible for the January anomaly.
This study highlights the impact of institutional traders on the January effect in
Poland and Hungary. The history of both emerging stock markets provides a unique
institutional environment to investigate the influence of individual and institutional
investors on the January anomaly. In Poland, the pension system reform on May 19,
1999, separates the history of the stock market into a period of predominantly indi-
vidual trading and a period of increased institutional trading. Similarly, in Hungary,
private pension funds were founded in 1997 and started their financial activities in
1998. Before 1998, primarily small individual investors populated the Hungarian stock
market.
The pension system reform in both countries changed the investor structure due
to the enrichment of the old pay-as-you-go system with a privately managed pension
funds pillar. Since 1999, pension funds have become an important group of institutional
investors on the Polish and Hungarian stock markets. In addition to the change of the
investor structure, in both countries capital gains taxes do not exist, thus excluding the
tax-loss-selling hypothesis as a rationale for the January effect. Consequently, if a Jan-
uary effect can be detected in the data during the period before the entrance of pension
fund investors in both stock markets, then it must be driven by an anomalous trading
behavior of Polish and Hungarian individual investors. We exploit the increased insti-
tutional ownership in both emerging capital markets to provide evidence on the impact
of individual and institutional investors’ trading decisions on the January anomaly.
Relying on the institutional background of the Polish and the Hungarian stock
markets, we contribute to the literature answering the following two questions. First,
is there evidence in favor of a January effect during the period of individual trading?
If this is the case, we can conclude that individual investors’ non-fundamentally driven
trading decisions led to the January anomaly. Second, in which way did Polish and
Hungarian pension fund investors contribute to the January anomaly after 1999 and
1998, respectively? In case pension funds exhibit window-dressing behavior, we expect
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a strengthening effect on the January anomaly. In contrast, if pension funds’ trad-
ing decisions are more influenced by fundamental information, a dampening effect on
unusually high stock returns in January can be expected.4
The remainder of this section proceeds as follows. Subsection 4.1.2 outlines the
institutional background for Poland and Hungary. Subsection 4.1.3 introduces the data
set, Subsection 4.1.4 describes the econometric methodology, and Subsection 4.1.5 con-
tains the empirical findings. Subsection 4.1.6 provides robustness checks, and Subsec-
tion 4.1.7 summarizes and concludes.
4.1.2 Institutional Background
4.1.2.1 Poland
Re-established in 1991, the Polish stock market has grown rapidly during the last
decade in terms of both the number of companies listed and market capitalization.
In comparison to the two other European Union accession countries in the region,
namely the Czech Republic and Hungary, the capitalization of the Polish stock market
is significantly higher. It is comparable to that of the smaller mature European stock
markets like Austria and reached approximately 60 billion US$ at the end of 2004
(WSE (2005)).
The change in the investor structure on the Polish stock market has its origin
in the pension system reform. In 1999, the public system was enriched by a private
component, represented by open-end pension funds. Participation in this component,
often called the “second pillar”, is mandatory for employees below certain age. They
are obliged to transfer 7.3% of their gross salary to the government-run social insur-
ance institute called ZakÃlad Ubezpieczen´ SpoÃlecznych (ZUS), which in turn transfers
the collected contributions to the pension funds.5 The first transfer of money from the
ZUS to the pension funds took place on May 19, 1999. This date marks a change of
4 It is obvious that the date of entrance of pension funds into the stock market plays an important
role in the following investigation. Similarly, one branch of the literature studies the impact of the
introduction of futures markets on stock return anomalies of the spot market underlying (Kamara
(1997), Szakmary and Kiefer (2004)). In our investigation, we can exclude an influence from the
introduction of futures markets because these markets were established earlier (January 16, 1998, in
Poland and March 31, 1995, in Hungary) than the appearing of pension fund investors on the stock
markets took place. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that there may be other possible explanations
for the decreasing January effect, like an ongoing efficiency with increased integration of transition
economies (Rockinger and Urga (2001)). We control for this influence and provide empirical evidence
in Subsection 4.1.6.
5 For a more detailed description of the Polish pension system and for further references see
Voronkova and Bohl (2005).
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the investor structure on the Polish stock market. In 1999, about 20% domestic insti-
tutional investors and 45% domestic individual investors traded at the Warsaw Stock
Exchange. Over time the proportion of domestic institutional traders has increased,
whereas the relative importance of individual investors has decreased. In 2004, approx-
imately one-third of the investors were domestic individuals, and about one-third were
national institutions. Constantly about one-third of the investors on the Polish stock
market adhere to the group of foreign investors.
While before May 19, 1999, the majority of traders were small, private investors,
after that date pension funds became an important group of institutional investors on
the stock market in Poland. There were also some mutual funds active in the market,
but they had relatively small amounts of capital under management. Moreover, the role
of corporate investors, i.e., companies investing their capital surpluses, was very small.
This unique institutional characteristic allows us to compare the period before May
19, 1999—characterized by predominantly non-institutional trading—with the period
after that date, when pension funds as institutional investors started to act on the
stock market.
The number of pension funds in the 1999–2003 period varied between 15 and
21. The change in their number occurred mainly due to some acquisitions of smaller
funds by larger ones. It is important to note, however, that their structure as well as
the structure of the assets under their management remained invariant. By the end of
2003, 17 pension funds operated in the Polish stock market with about 12 billion US$
under management. In comparison, Polish insurance companies and mutual funds had
only 3 and 1 billion US$ of assets, respectively. In 2003, pension funds invested about
4 billion US$ in stocks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Their stock holdings
predominantly consist of large-capitalization stocks that are listed in the blue-chip
index WIG20 and usually belong to the Top 5 in their industries.
Concerning capital gains taxation, in Poland the following regulations were in
force:6 Until the end of 2003, capital gains from the sale of shares were tax-exempt
for domestic individual investors. Since January 1, 2004 capital gains of this type
have been taxed at a flat rate of 19%. For corporations, capital gains have consis-
tently been treated as part of the company’s profits and therefore been taxed at the
regular corporate income tax rate. Polish pension fund investors are tax-exempt. Div-
6 For detailed information, see Ernst & Young (2006a), Ernst & Young (2006b), Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers (2006a), and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006b).
CHAPTER 4. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY 75
idend withholding taxes varied over the period under review, the latest rate being 19%
(effective 2004). However, the number of firms paying dividends is low.
4.1.2.2 Hungary
The Budapest Stock Exchange, re-established in 1990, experienced a significant in-
crease in its capitalization, attaining about 6 billion US$ in 1996, mainly due to the
privatization of Hungary’s bigger state-owned companies such as Mol, OTP, Gedeon
Richter, and Matav. In the following years, the stock market went through a phase of
continuous growth, reaching a capitalization of 30 billion US$ at the end of 2004.
The introduction of a three-pillar pension system on January 1, 1998, had an
influence on the Hungarian stock market because a growing share of households’ sav-
ings was channeled to stock market investments through pension funds. Since 1998,
individuals can choose between the mandatory public system—the first pillar—and the
mandatory private system. Open-end private mandatory pension funds represent the
second pillar of the Hungarian pension system. The first 38 mandatory private funds
started their activities in 1998 with 134 million US$ of assets under management and
about 1.3 million members. The third pillar consists of voluntary pension funds, which
can be both open-end and closed-end funds and also play an important role with a
comparable amount of assets.7
The establishment of the private mandatory pension funds in 1998 was beneficial
and stimulating for voluntary pension funds. The year 1998 can therefore be considered
as the year when pension funds appeared as institutional investors on the Hungarian
stock market. However, compared to the institutional framework in Poland, the exact
date of entrance of pension funds into the Hungarian stock market is less clear-cut
and hardly traceable. Whereas for Poland May 19, 1999, is known as the start date
of pension funds’ investment activities and well-documented as such, the investment
activities of Hungarian pension funds seemed to develop gradually over the year 1998.
Detailed information on this issue is practically not available. Consequently, we choose
January 1, 1999, as the start date of increased institutional ownership on the Hungarian
stock market to ensure that the entire post-event period is characterized by institutional
trading activities. The pension funds’ capital was growing during the following years
and, by the end of 2004, amounted to 4 and 2.5 billion US$ for the mandatory and
voluntary pension funds, respectively.
7 The first voluntary pension funds started their activity already in 1994. However, the assets
under their management were marginal at that time.
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The number of pension funds decreased over time, mainly due to acquisitions, and
by the end of 2004, 18 private and 75 voluntary pension funds remained in the market.
Contrary to other countries, where pension funds participate directly in the stock
market, in Hungary an increasing number of pension funds entrusted their assets to
investment fund managers. Consequently, the impact of pension funds on stock market
prices should be evaluated by means of portfolio managers’ investment activities. At
the end of 2004, 23 investment fund managers had under their management 4.9 billion
US$ of pension fund assets, 5.2 billion US$ of investment fund assets, and 3.7 billion
US$ of contributions from other sources. Notwithstanding the assignment of pension
funds’ assets to portfolio managers, their investment activities have to adhere to the
pension funds’ investment regulations specified by law. In addition, the accumulated
accounts can be invested in the longer term since contributions are not accessible before
retirement.
In Hungary, capital gains realized by individual investors on the domestic or any
other European Union stock exchange were considered as non-taxable interest-type
income during our sample period.8 Capital gains on transactions not qualified as stock
exchange deals are, however, subject to tax at a top tax rate of currently 25%. Only
for a short period of time (2001–2002), stock market gains were also taxed at the then
applicable uniform 20% capital gains tax rate. For corporate investors, capital gains are
included in taxable income and taxed at standard rates. While inter-company dividend
payments are tax-exempt, the dividend withholding tax rate for individual recipients
varied, current rates being flat at either 25% or 35% (effective 2005). Pension funds
are not subject to tax on the proceeds of the funds; these are only taxed once they are
paid out to contributors.
4.1.3 Data
Poland. The data for Poland contain daily closing prices for all stocks listed on the
Warsaw Stock Exchange in the period from October 3, 1994 to March 31, 2004.9 These
8 As of September 1, 2006, a 20% capital gains tax rate applies in this case. For more detailed
information on capital gains taxation, see Ernst & Young (2006a), Ernst & Young (2006b), Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers (2006a), and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006b).
9 The selection of the start date is due to the following reasoning. Shortly after its re-opening,
the Polish stock market experienced a stock price increase of 924% from May 6, 1993 to March 8,
1994, and a subsequent crash. Furthermore, it was not until October 3, 1994, that trading on the
Warsaw Stock Exchange was extended from four days to five days a week. Starting our inquiry at the
beginning of October 1994 ensures that the empirical findings are neither distorted by the bubble and
crash periods nor affected by the change in trading frequency.
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time series were directly provided by the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). Altogether,
the sample comprises 278 firms over the indicated sample period. The time series are
stock-split adjusted and corrected for outliers to assure that our results are not driven
or distorted by few extreme values. For this purpose, the 0.5% of highest and lowest
returns observed in the data set are excluded from the investigation and, therefore,
deleted from all subsamples.
To investigate the impact of the pension funds’ investment activities, we construct
two subsamples of actively institutionally traded stocks as follows. We calculate a
measure of each stock’s institutional coverage by dividing the aggregate pension fund
holdings of that stock by the overall aggregate pension fund holdings in a particular
year. This measure can be interpreted as the percentage share of a particular stock
in the aggregate pension fund holdings. A stock is defined as actively institutionally
traded in a given year if the measure of relative institutional holdings exceeds 1%.10
We calculate this measure for all stocks and all years separately during the 1999–
2003 period and end up with five yearly measures of relative pension fund holdings for
each individual stock. A stock is included in the first sample of actively institutionally
traded stocks if the pension fund holding measure of this stock exceeds the 1% level in
at least three out of the five years. This amounts to 60% of the post-event period. In
an alternative, less strict definition a stock has to exceed the 1% cut-off point in at least
two of the five years, i.e., during 40% of the post-event period. These criteria result
in the identification of 20 stocks for the stricter definition and 28 stocks for the less
strict definition of institutionally traded shares. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.1 provide
additional information about these stocks. Whereas Polish pension fund investors do
not have a preference for stocks of a specific sector, they concentrate their investments
on large firms’ stocks.
[Insert Table 4.1 here]
Hungary. For Hungary, the data consist of daily closing prices for the stocks listed
on the Budapest Stock Exchange in the period from January 3, 1994 to December 31,
2004. The time series were obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream. Altogether,
10 We drop stocks with only marginal institutional coverage as for these stocks institutional trading
behavior may not have a large impact on stock returns. The 1% cut-off point is arbitrarily chosen
but proved to be an acceptable compromise for the purpose of our study. On the one hand, it allows
us to eliminate those stocks which are not at all or only marginally covered by institutional investors
and to come up with a limited number of stocks that are actively traded by institutions. On the other
hand, the size of the resulting subsamples is still sufficient for econometric testing.
CHAPTER 4. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY 78
the cross-section of the sample comprises 84 firms. The same trimming procedure was
applied to the data set as described above for the Polish case. In contrast to Poland,
we do not have reliable information regarding stock splits, dividends, and other impact
factors on stock returns. This provides an additional reason for the exclusion 0.5% of
the extreme stock return observations in both tails of the distribution.
To determine a subsample of institutionally traded stocks for the Hungarian stock
market, we requested the portfolio holdings of all Hungarian pension funds. The pen-
sion funds’ replies show that their stock market investment decisions closely mirror the
composition of the main stock index BUX. In the sample of Hungarian stocks actively
traded by institutional investors, we therefore focus on the stocks included in the BUX.
Information on the BUX composition was provided by the Budapest Stock Exchange
(BSE) for the 1996–2004 period. Contrary to Poland, we do not use a 1% cut-off cri-
terion because the BUX is dominated by very few stocks with high weights. Hence,
a cut-off point as the one mentioned above would considerably reduce our sample in
size. The number of stocks included in the institutional sample would be too small to
conduct a cross-sectional investigation.
For a strict definition of institutionally traded stocks that is roughly in line with
the selection criterion for Poland, we use all stocks that are included in the BUX for
at least 60% of the time in the post-reform sample period 1998–2004. This definition
results in the identification of 17 institutionally traded stocks. For a less strict defini-
tion, we require inclusion in the BUX for at least 40% of the same time period. The
less strict definition increases the sample of institutionally traded stocks to 19. We use
these two subsamples of 17 and 19 stocks to investigate the effect of institutional trad-
ing on the Hungarian stock market. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.1 list the Hungarian
companies selected together with their sector affiliation.
4.1.4 Methodology
4.1.4.1 Groupwise Regressions
In the empirical investigation we distinguish between the impact of predominantly in-
dividual versus increased institutional ownership on stock returns in January. First,
the hypothesis is investigated that individual investors exhibit anomalous trading be-
havior and cause abnormally high stock returns in January. Second, we analyze the
hypothesis that institutions are informed traders relying on fundamental information
and, consequently, the entrance of pension funds on the stock market dampens the
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anomalous January effect.11 If the contrary holds, the trading behavior of pension
funds can be ascribed a positive contribution to higher stock returns in January rel-
ative to other months of the year, which would be in line with the window-dressing
hypothesis.
The hypotheses are investigated within a panel framework and separately tested
for different subsamples of stocks from Poland and Hungary. The look beyond aggregate
index data proves beneficial since we can exploit the richer information in the cross-
section of returns. The advantages of a panel data model over a purely time-series
investigation of index data or individual shares are manifold (see, e.g., Baltagi (2005)).
Most importantly, unobserved individual heterogeneity can be controlled for that would
otherwise have to go undetected and could generate biased results. Specifically, the
following one-way error component regression model is run:
ri,t = β0 + β1JANt + β2JAN
Post
t + β3ri,t−1 + ui + ei,t, (4.1)
where the subscript i denotes the cross-sectional and t the time-series dimension of the
data set. The dependent variable is the daily stock return ri,t, calculated as the loga-
rithmic difference in prices, ri,t = 100 ln(Pi,t/Pi,t−1), where Pi,t denotes the individual
stock price at the close of every trading day.
JANt is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 in January throughout
the whole sample period (0 otherwise). The dummy variable JANPostt is 1 only for
those January observations that fall into the post-pension system reform period, i.e.,
beginning with January 2000 for Poland and January 1999 for Hungary (0 otherwise).
In addition, we allow for stock returns autocorrelation in the time-series dimension
by including the lagged dependent variable ri,t−1 as an additional explanatory vari-
able.12 ui denotes an unobservable stock-specific random effect. ei,t is the remainder
disturbance. Assumptions made by the error-component model are that ui ∼ N(0, σ2u)
and ei,t ∼ N(0, σ2e), and that the individual error components ui and ei,t are neither
11 The Polish pension system reform, the associated increase in institutional trading, and its im-
plications for market efficiency/stabilization have been investigated with different foci in previous
literature: Bohl, Brzeszczyn´ski, and Wilfling (2008) and Bohl and Brzeszczyn´ski (2006) examine
stock return volatility, Ge¸bka, Henke, and Bohl (2006) return autocorrelation, and Voronkova and
Bohl (2005) scrutinize the investment behavior of pension funds.
12 In panels with a short time dimension the presence of lagged dependent variables causes incon-
sistent and biased estimates. However, in our case T is quite large so that the bias resulting from the
presence of a lagged dependent variable can be neglected (Judson and Owen (1999), Baltagi (2005)).
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correlated with each other nor autocorrelated across both cross-section and time-series
units.13
In the above specification, a positive and significant parameter β1 provides ev-
idence in favor of a January effect in stock returns. For the interpretation of the
parameter β2, three cases have to be distinguished: First, a negative and significant
coefficient β2 indicates a reduction of positive January stock returns (estimated by βˆ1)
due to the entrance of pension funds as institutional investors into the market. Sec-
ond, if β2 is positive and significant, then institutional investors’ trading behavior is
in line with the window-dressing hypothesis because a strengthening of the January
anomaly can be observed. Third, if β2 is statistically insignificant, institutions do not
have an influence on the January anomaly. The sum (β1 + β2) provides a measure of
the magnitude of the January effect in the period of increased institutional trading.
4.1.4.2 Joint Estimation
In addition to testing the hypotheses separately for the four different subsamples de-
scribed above, we estimate the following joint model with interaction variables:
ri,t = β0 + β1(JANt × INSTi) + β2(JANPostt × INSTi)
+ β3INSTi + β4POSTt + ui + ei,t,
(4.2)
where all previously introduced variables are defined as in Equation (4.1).14 In addition,
the indicator variable INSTi equals 1 for those companies included in the sample of
institutionally traded stocks and is 0 otherwise. POSTt is a dummy variable with value
1 for the period of increased institutional trading and 0 otherwise. The interaction
variables (JANt× INSTi) and (JANPostt × INSTi) correspond to JANt and JANPostt
in Equation (4.1) when it is estimated for the institutional subsamples.
The model specified above is estimated for both subsamples of institutionally
traded stocks. We henceforth refer to the version estimated with the more strictly
defined institutional dummy INSTi as Equation (4.2a) and to the less strictly defined
variant as Equation (4.2b). The coefficients β1 and β2 can be interpreted as described
for Equation (4.1). In addition, β3 captures possible systematic differences between
average stock returns of the institutional and the control sample, and β4 displays
13 The model selection is supported by Hausman specification tests (Hausman (1978)). We also test
for serial correlation in the error distribution with Lagrange-multiplier (LM) tests (Breusch (1978),
Godfrey (1978)).
14 The lagged dependent variable is dropped from the regressor list for the sake of brevity since its
inclusion did not alter the empirical findings.
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aggregate factors that affected average stock returns over time in the same way for
institutionally traded and non-traded shares.
4.1.5 Empirical Findings
4.1.5.1 Summary Statistics
All results are presented separately for the two subsamples of stocks actively traded
by institutional investors, a control sample of all stocks excluding the stocks identified
as institutionally traded as well as the whole sample reflecting the entire Polish and
Hungarian stock markets. Hence, we are able to analyze the impact of the Polish and
Hungarian pension system reform on stock returns not only through time—before and
after the pension funds’ appearance as institutional traders on the stock market—but
also in a cross-sectional dimension, i.e., among stocks more actively traded and those
nearly non-traded by institutional investors.
To gain some first insight into the seasonal patterns inherent in our data, daily av-
erage stock returns for January and for February to December are reported in Table 4.2.
Daily mean stock returns in January are positive and higher than average stock returns
between February and December for all samples. Furthermore, for both institutional
subsamples (Panels A1, B1, A2, B2) we observe higher average January stock returns
during the 1994–1999 (1994–1998) period relative to the years 2000–2004 (1999–2004)
for Poland (Hungary). This also refers to the whole samples (Panels D1, D2) which
include all stocks listed on the respective stock exchange. Interestingly, for the Polish
control sample (Panel C1) we observe an increase of average stock returns over time,
whereas Hungarian stock returns (Panel C2) are slightly lower in the 1999–2004 period
compared to the 1994–1998 subsample.
[Insert Table 4.2 here]
4.1.5.2 Regression Results
Poland. Table 4.3 displays the results from estimating regression (4.1) for Poland.
When looking at the outcomes for the two subsamples of actively institutionally traded
stocks (Panels A and B), we find evidence in favor of a pronounced January effect in
the period when the Polish stock market was dominated by individual investors. The
estimated coefficients of the January effect are about 0.36. All coefficient estimates of
the dummy variable JANt are statistically significant at the 1% level. The empirical
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findings in favor of a January effect are insofar interesting as during the period of
predominately individual trading capital gains taxes did not exist in Poland. Hence,
the tax-loss-selling hypothesis can be ruled out as a rationale for higher stock returns
in January. We can therefore conclude that Polish stock returns dynamics exhibit
an anomalous January effect during the period prior to the entrance of institutional
investors, which may be explained by individual investors’ sentiment.15
[Insert Table 4.3 here]
Moreover, for both institutional samples the magnitude of the January effect
decreases in the period after the pension fund investors’ entrance into the stock mar-
ket, measured by the coefficients of the post-reform dummy JANPostt . The estimated
parameter values are statistically significant and about −0.22. Thus, the significant
negative parameter estimates of this institutional investors dummy lead us to reject
the window-dressing hypothesis. The anomalous January effect in stock returns does
not entirely disappear after the entrance of pension funds as institutional investors into
the Polish stock market. However, its magnitude becomes substantially lower.
The results are robust towards the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable
ri,t−1. For both institutional samples, the coefficient of ri,t−1 is positive and significant,
which can be explained by the implications of strategic trading models (Kyle (1985),
Barclay and Warner (1993)). Rational informed investors spread their trades over
time to conceal information. By breaking up a large order into several smaller trades,
institutional investors reduce the overall price impact. Moreover, price impacts may
be inversely related to market liquidity (Madhavan and Smidt (1993)). This suggests
that the benefits of trading over a longer horizon are greater in thin relative to liquid
stock markets which, in turn, implies an increase in trade duration and a decrease
in order size. Moreover, the significance of a lagged dependent variable may indicate
predictability in stock returns and a violation of the efficient markets hypothesis.
The estimated results for the control sample (Panel C) consisting of all stocks ex-
cept for the 28 institutionally traded ones reinforce the above findings. The coefficients
of the dummy variable JANt are positive and significant at the 10% and 19% levels.
Hence, we find at least weak evidence indicating that a January effect exists in returns
of non-institutionally traded stocks. In contrast to the results for the two institutional
15 The existence of a January effect in stock returns without capital gains taxes is not new. Tinic,
Barone-Adesi, and West (1987) provide evidence for Canada and Jones, Pearce, and Wilson (1987)
for the U.S. before capital gains were taxed in these countries.
CHAPTER 4. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY 83
samples, the parameters for JANPostt are statistically insignificant. For stocks not
actively traded by Polish pension fund investors, the magnitude of the January effect
does not decrease during the period after May 19, 1999.16 The statistically insignificant
parameters for JANPostt in the control sample emphasize that the estimated decrease
in the two institutional samples is caused by the institutions’ trading behavior and not
by other factors.17 In addition, the estimated coefficient of the variable JANPostt for
the whole market is not significant either, which suggests that the January effect for
the market as a whole continues to be driven by individual investors.
The empirical findings of model (4.2) are reported in the bottom part of Table 4.3.
The pronounced January effect for actively institutionally traded Polish stocks is con-
firmed, as is the substantial decrease in the anomaly’s magnitude after the entrance of
pension funds into the stock market. In addition, stocks actively traded by institutions
earn significantly higher returns relative to the rest of the sample. The period of in-
creased institutional trading is accompanied by higher average stock returns compared
to the period before the pension system reform.
Hungary. The findings for Hungary in Table 4.4 are consistent with the ones for the
Polish stock market and support the pension funds’ impact on the January anomaly.
The estimation results for the two subsamples of actively institutionally traded stocks
(Panels A and B) show a pronounced January effect in the period before the invest-
ment activities of Hungarian pension funds. The estimated parameters of the dummy
variable JANt are about 0.44 and are statistically significant. In line with the results
for Poland, the tax-loss-selling hypothesis as a rationale for higher January stock re-
turns can be ruled out because capital gains are not taxed in Hungary. Moreover, the
anomalous January effect decreases drastically after the entrance of pension funds into
the stock market with statistically significant coefficients for JANPostt of about −0.36.
The findings are robust concerning the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable.
The estimated parameters are positive and significant, supporting the implications of
16 Given the marginal level of significance of the JANt coefficients, we run separate regressions
investigating whether a January effect exists in the post-event period. The values of the coefficients
of the January dummy variables are slightly higher relative to the ones reported in Table 4.3 and
are significant at the 1% level. Hence, a January effect exists in the period after May 19, 1999, in
non-institutionally traded Polish stocks.
17 The January effect in the pre-event period is substantially higher for institutionally traded stocks
compared to the stocks in the control sample. A reason for this finding may be the extreme illiquidity
of a subset of stocks in the control sample. As our study focusses on the evolution of January stock
returns over time instead of the level of the January effect for particular stocks, we do not further
explore this issue.
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strategic trading models and market liquidity as well as considerations on the violation
of the efficient markets hypothesis outlined above.
[Insert Table 4.4 here]
The empirical results of the control sample (Panel C) also indicate that a January
effect exists in the period before Hungarian pension funds invested on the stock mar-
ket. The estimated parameters of JANt are positive and significant at the 1% level.
In line with the findings for Poland, the magnitude of the January effect is smaller
for non-institutionally traded shares relative to stocks actively institutionally traded.
More importantly, the estimated coefficients of the dummy variable JANPostt are not
statistically significant. This finding supports the hypothesis that the estimated de-
crease in the two institutional samples is caused by institutions’ trading behavior and
not by other factors. The decrease in the magnitude of the January effect is also ob-
served for the whole market. Lastly, the estimation of regression model (4.2) supports
the empirical results discussed above.
4.1.6 Robustness Checks
4.1.6.1 Control Variables
All results presented so far were calculated for a sample where 0.5% of extreme stock
returns in both tails of the distribution were dropped. As a check of robustness, we
repeated the above analysis using the sample without excluding the outliers. The
results for Poland are qualitatively identical. The same holds for Hungary except for
the findings of the control sample. For this subsample, very few large return outliers
seem to impact the findings and justify our outlier correction.18
Furthermore, we tackle the objection that the compelling evidence in favor of
a decreasing January effect brought by institutional investors might merely be a re-
flection of some common influence or trend. For instance, the dynamics of January
returns in Poland and Hungary might be impacted by developments on the U.S. stock
markets or simply be driven by a time trend towards increased efficiency, along with
ongoing integration of the Eastern European transition economies with other already
established markets. For this purpose, we widen the baseline regression model (4.1) to
allow for a set of control variables:
ri,t = β0 + β1JANt + β2JAN
Post
t + β3ri,t−1 + c
′Xt + ui + ei,t. (4.3)
18 The findings are not reported but available on request.
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All constituents of Equation (4.3) are defined as previously. In addition, c′ denotes a
1×3 vector of parameters, c′ = (c1, . . . , c3), and Xt is a 3×1 vector of control variables:
Xt =

rUSt−1
TIMEt
V OLt
 ,
where
1. rUSt−1 is the one-period lagged return of the S&P 500 Index
19, calculated as the
logarithmic difference in prices, rUSt−1 = 100 ln(P
US
t−1/P
US
t−2);
2. TIMEt is a linear time trend;
3. V OLt is the logarithm of aggregate trading volume in the respective market on
day t, compounded as V OLt = ln(
∑n
i=1 V OLi,t), where n stands for the number
of individual stocks.
Volume data were downloaded from Thomson Financial Datastream. Lagged
U.S. stock returns are meant to capture international influences, whereas the latter
two variables account for the development of the Polish and Hungarian stock markets
over the decade investigated. Should the significant reduction in abnormal January
returns be due to a common time trend or more active trading in general, we would
expect such an evolution to be mirrored in significant coefficients for TIMEt or V OLt.
The results of this robustness check are displayed in Table 4.5. In general, the em-
pirical findings are fairly insensitive towards the inclusion of the three control variables.
The estimated coefficients of the January dummy JANt are positive and statistically
significant in all cases at the 1% level. More importantly, the coefficients of the JANPostt
dummy variable are in the majority of cases negative and statistically significant at
least at the 5% level, while two parameters are still significant at the 14% level. This
finding is robust towards the inclusion of the control variables either individually or
jointly.20 Our main hypothesis that the decrease in the anomaly’s magnitude is driven
by the institutions’ trading activities is confirmed.
[Insert Table 4.5 here]
19 S&P stands for Standard and Poor’s, a U.S. provider of stock market indices.
20 We do, however, not bundle trading volume variables and the time trend together into one
equation to avoid potential multicollinearity problems due to high positive correlation between these
variables (0.91 for Poland and 0.53 for Hungary).
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4.1.6.2 Rolling Regressions
Finally, we investigate whether the decrease in the magnitude of the January anomaly
takes place gradually over a longer period or within a relatively short period of time.
This question is relevant because it helps us to assess whether the observed results are
really due to the appearance of institutional investors on the stock market. To accom-
plish this task, we use a rolling estimation window technique and run the regression:
ri,t = α+ βJANt + ui + ei,t, (4.4)
where all variables are defined as in Equation (4.1). Starting in October 1994 for
Poland and in January 1994 for Hungary, we estimate this regression for a three-year
time period and obtain a parameter estimate of β. This parameter is an estimate of
the average January effect during the estimation period. Then we move the estimation
window by one month toward the end of the sample and estimate regression (4.4) again.
We end up with a time series of β estimates that can be plotted and subjected to visual
investigation afterwards.
Last, we present the findings of the rolling estimation of Equation (4.4). For
Poland, the estimated β coefficients are displayed in Figure 4.1. The upper graph is
the estimate for the institutionally traded sample including 20 stocks, the lower graph
for the institutional sample with 28 stocks. All data points left of the first vertical
marker contain January data from only the pre-event period, all points right of the
second vertical marker only include January stock returns from the post-event period.
The coefficients in between the two vertical lines were obtained from samples covering
January stock returns from both the post- and the pre-event periods.
[Insert Figure 4.1 here]
In consistence with our theoretical proposition, we observe a drastic decline of the
β parameter over time. For the pre-event period, β estimates are large. The inclusion
of post-event data leads to a decrease in the estimated β coefficients. Once there are
only data from post-event January stock returns included in the sample (the data to
the right of the second vertical marker), β estimates sharply decline and stabilize on a
considerably lower level. Thus, we observe a decreasing January effect exactly at the
time when Polish pension fund managers entered the market.21
21 These results are robust to the length of the estimation window and the size of the shift. We
used estimation windows of 18, 24, and 30 months and obtained comparable results. Similarly, when
moving forward the window by one week instead of one month, the results are almost identical.
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Figure 4.2 shows the estimated β coefficients for the two Hungarian institutional
subsamples. The βs are calculated in the same manner as for Poland. During the
period before the first marker, the estimated β coefficients are about 0.50. They decline
drastically to values around 0.10 after the first January stock returns from the post-
event periods are included in the regressions. After the second vertical marker, the
estimated β parameters increase slightly and then fall to zero. Given the fact that,
contrary to the Polish market, we do not have a certain well-known starting point for
institutional trading on the Hungarian stock market, the evidence is naturally not as
clear-cut as the evidence for the Polish market. The tendency of falling β coefficients,
however, is nevertheless strong.
[Insert Figure 4.2 here]
4.1.7 Summary and Conclusions
The increase in the number of institutional investors trading on stock markets world-
wide since the end of the 1980s has been associated with a rising interest from part of
financial economists in institutions’ impact on stock prices. One branch of literature
investigates the effect of an increase in institutional ownership on the magnitude of
stock market anomalies. This study adds to the evidence available on the Monday effect
(Kamara (1997), Chan, Leung, and Wang (2004)) and the size effect (Gompers and
Metrick (2001)) by providing empirical results on the impact of institutional trading
on the January effect.
Our results shed light on the causes for the anomaly and enhance the under-
standing of the relationship between asset prices and the investor structure of stock
markets. The major difference between previous studies and ours is the unique in-
stitutional framework we exploit to investigate the role of institutional investors for
the January anomaly. After the pension system reforms in Poland on May 19, 1999,
and in Hungary in 1998, pension fund investors became traders on the stock market.
In contrast, before these dates the majority of traders were small, private investors.
Moreover, capital gains taxes did not exist in Poland and Hungary during the period
of predominantly individual trading.
The institutional features of the Polish and the Hungarian stock markets enable
us to investigate the role of individual and institutional investors on the magnitude
of the January effect. Our empirical findings are twofold. First, we can empirically
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confirm that there is a significant January effect in Polish and Hungarian stock returns
driven by the trading behavior of individuals. Due to the lack of capital gains taxes we
cannot rely on the tax-loss-selling hypothesis as a rational explanation for the January
effect. Instead, our findings suggest that higher stock returns in January during the
period before the pension system reforms in both countries are the result of possibly
sentiment-driven investment decisions by individual investors.
Second and more importantly, our empirical results show that the increase in
institutional trading on the Polish and the Hungarian stock markets had a significant
dampening effect on the magnitude of the January anomaly. Our evidence is compara-
ble to the results found in Kamara (1997) and Chan, Leung, and Wang (2004) for the
Monday effect as well as Gompers and Metrick (2001) for the size effect in the U.S. The
window-dressing hypothesis is not supported. The empirical evidence indicates that
trading by Polish and Hungarian pension funds to a certain extent arbitrages away
seasonal patterns in stock returns and, therefore, increases the efficiency of both stock
markets. The price effect of irrational trading patterns seems to be partly eliminated
by rational investors.
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4.1.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Rolling Estimation Results for Poland
 
 
Note: Regression results of Equation (4.4) for 20 (upper graph) and 28 (lower graph) stocks actively
traded by institutional investors. The figures display the evolution of the β coefficient over time.
The area left of the first vertical marker corresponds to the pre-event period, and right of the second
vertical marker is the post-event period.
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Figure 4.2: Rolling Estimation Results for Hungary
 
 
Note: Regression results of Equation (4.4) for 17 (upper graph) and 19 (lower graph) stocks actively
traded by institutional investors. The figures display the evolution of the β coefficient over time.
The area left of the first vertical marker corresponds to the pre-event period, and right of the second
vertical marker is the post-event period.
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Table 4.1: Stocks Actively Traded by Institutional Investors
Poland Hungary
Company Sector Company Sector
Panel A: Institutionally Traded Stocks (Strict Definition)
Agora Media Antenna Broadcasting
BPH Banking Borsodchem Chemicals
BRE Banking Danubius Hotels
BSK Banking Demasz Electricity Supply
Budimex Construction Egis Pharmaceuticals
Computerland IT Fotex Retail Trade
De¸bica Chemicals Magyar Telekom Telecommunications
Echo Construction MOL Oil/Natural Gas
Ke¸ty Metals NABI Engineering/Machinery
KGHM Metals OTP Banking
Orbis Hotels Pannonplast Plastics Industry
PBK Banking Pick Szeged Food Products
Pekao Banking Ra´ba Machinery
PGF Wholesale & Retails Richter Pharmaceuticals
PKN Chemicals Synergon IT
Prokom IT TVK Chemicals
Stomil Chemicals Zalakera´mia Construction
S´wiecie Wood & Paper
TPSA Telecommunications
WBK Banking
Panel B: Additional Institutionally Traded Stocks (Less Strict Definition)
BIG Banking Graboplast Textile
ComArch IT Pr´ımaga´z Gas services
Elektrim Telecommunications
Kredyt Bank Banking
Netia Telecommunications
Optimus IT
Softbank IT
Z˙ywiec Food
Note: The table presents the stocks identified as actively traded by institutional investors and the
corresponding sectors. The selection criteria are described in the text. When applying the stricter
(less strict) definition, 20 (28) Polish and 17 (19) Hungarian companies are included in the subsamples
of institutionally traded stocks.
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Table 4.2: Average Daily Stock Returns
Poland Hungary
Sample Period January February – Sample Period January February –
December December
Panel A1: Institutional Sample I (N = 20) Panel A2: Institutional Sample I (N = 17)
1994 – 1999 0.3964 0.0624 1994 – 1998 0.4471 0.0368
2000 – 2004 0.1618 0.0186 1999 – 2004 0.0849 −0.0166
1994 – 2004 0.2452 0.0382 1994 – 2004 0.1993 0.0010
Panel B1: Institutional Sample II (N = 28) Panel B2: Institutional Sample II (N = 19)
1994 – 1999 0.3902 0.0642 1994 – 1998 0.4523 0.0369
2000 – 2004 0.1758 −0.0331 1999 – 2004 0.0662 −0.0176
1994 – 2004 0.2546 0.0110 1994 – 2004 0.1973 0.0018
Panel C1: Control Sample (N = 250) Panel C2: Control Sample (N = 65)
1994 – 1999 0.0004 −0.0582 1994 – 1998 0.1841 −0.0556
2000 – 2004 0.0190 −0.0361 1999 – 2004 0.1134 0.0568
1994 – 2004 0.0131 −0.0452 1994 – 2004 0.1410 0.0115
Panel D1: Whole Sample (N = 278) Panel D2: Whole Sample (N = 84)
1994 – 1999 0.0586 −0.0406 1994 – 1998 0.2611 −0.0287
2000 – 2004 0.0385 −0.0357 1999 – 2004 0.0976 0.0319
1994 – 2004 0.0450 −0.0378 1994 – 2004 0.1588 0.0084
Note: Mean stock returns are calculated as simple arithmetic averages of daily stock returns and
reported in percentage points. The overall sample period is from October 3, 1994 to March 31, 2004,
for Poland and from January 3, 1994 to December 31, 2004, for Hungary. The years 1999 and 1998
mark the dates of the Polish and the Hungarian pension system reforms, respectively. N denotes the
number of stocks.
CHAPTER 4. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY 93
Table 4.3: Empirical Results for Poland
Regression Coefficients
Model Const JANt JANPostt ri,t−1
Panel A: Institutional Sample I (N = 20)
(4.1) 0.0399∗∗∗ 0.3512∗∗∗ −0.2306∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0829) (0.1015) (0.0053)
(4.1) 0.0382∗∗ 0.3582∗∗∗ −0.2347∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0830) (0.1017)
Panel B: Institutional Sample II (N = 28)
(4.1) 0.0114 0.3730∗∗∗ −0.2089∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0714) (0.0882) (0.0044)
(4.1) 0.0104 0.3787∗∗∗ −0.2134∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0717) (0.0886)
Panel C: Control Sample (N = 250)
(4.1) −0.0535∗∗∗ 0.0559∗ 0.0065 −0.0336∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0341) (0.0408) (0.0017)
(4.1) −0.0452∗∗∗ 0.0456† 0.0186
(0.0060) (0.0344) (0.0411)
Panel D: Whole Sample (N = 278)
(4.1) −0.0445∗∗∗ 0.1069∗∗∗ −0.0317 −0.0277∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0310) (0.0372) (0.0016)
(4.1) −0.0378∗∗∗ 0.0963∗∗∗ −0.0200
(0.0055) (0.0313) (0.0375)
Model Const (JANt
× INSTi)
(JANPostt
× INSTi)
INSTi POSTt
(4.2a) −0.0700∗∗∗ 0.3872∗∗∗ −0.2796∗∗ 0.0791∗∗∗ 0.0450∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0991) (0.1215) (0.0189) (0.0112)
(4.2b) −0.0718∗∗∗ 0.4086∗∗∗ −0.2608∗∗ 0.0534∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0814) (0.1008) (0.0161) (0.0113)
Note: The estimated models are (4.1) ri,t = β0 + β1JANt + β2JANPostt + β3ri,t−1 + ui + ei,t and
(4.2) ri,t = β0+β1(JANt×INSTi)+β2(JANPostt ×INSTi)+β3INSTi+β4POSTt+ui+ei,t, where
stock returns are calculated as ri,t = 100 ln(Pi,t/Pi,t−1). JANt (JANPostt ) denotes a dummy variable
which takes on the value of 1 in January throughout the whole sample period (only in the post-pension
system reform period) and 0 otherwise. INSTi is a dummy variable indicating a stock’s affiliation to
the stricter [less strict] subsample of institutionally traded shares for Equation (4.2a) [(4.2b)] with a
value of 1 (0 otherwise). POSTt is a dummy with value 1 for the period of increased institutional
trading and 0 otherwise. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively, and † at the 19% level.
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Table 4.4: Empirical Results for Hungary
Regression Coefficients
Model Const JANt JANPostt ri,t−1
Panel A: Institutional Sample I (N = 17)
(4.1) 0.0003 0.4357∗∗∗ −0.3541∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0832) (0.0991) (0.0051)
(4.1) −0.0021 0.4405∗∗∗ −0.3544∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0837) (0.0998)
Panel B: Institutional Sample II (N = 19)
(4.1) 0.0012 0.4449∗∗∗ −0.3822∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0770) (0.0932) (0.0048)
(4.1) −0.0006 0.4468∗∗∗ −0.3807∗∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0774) (0.0939)
Panel C: Control Sample (N = 65)
(4.1) 0.0094 0.1701∗∗∗ −0.0575 −0.0500∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0605) (0.0760) (0.0033)
(4.1) 0.0115 0.1726∗∗∗ −0.0707
(0.0112) (0.0608) (0.0765)
Panel D: Whole Sample (N = 84)
(4.1) 0.0067 0.2555∗∗∗ −0.1598∗∗∗ −0.0309∗∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0481) (0.0598) (0.0027)
(4.1) 0.0062 0.2518∗∗∗ −0.1622∗∗∗
(0.0098) (0.0484) (0.0603)
Model Const (JANt
× INSTi)
(JANPostt
× INSTi)
INSTi POSTt
(4.2a) −0.0139 0.4801∗∗∗ −0.4135∗∗∗ −0.0246 0.0563∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0994) (0.1190) (0.0223) (0.0179)
(4.2b) −0.0156 0.4849∗∗∗ −0.4397∗∗∗ −0.0218 0.0581∗∗∗
(0.0158) (0.0909) (0.1108) (0.0216) (0.0179)
Note: The estimated models are (4.1) ri,t = β0 + β1JANt + β2JANPostt + β3ri,t−1 + ui + ei,t and
(4.2) ri,t = β0+β1(JANt×INSTi)+β2(JANPostt ×INSTi)+β3INSTi+β4POSTt+ui+ei,t, where
stock returns are calculated as ri,t = 100 ln(Pi,t/Pi,t−1). JANt (JANPostt ) denotes a dummy variable
which takes on the value of 1 in January throughout the whole sample period (only in the post-pension
system reform period) and 0 otherwise. INSTi is a dummy variable indicating a stock’s affiliation to
the stricter [less strict] subsample of institutionally traded shares for Equation (4.2a) [(4.2b)] with a
value of 1 (0 otherwise). POSTt is a dummy with value 1 during the period of increased institutional
trading and 0 otherwise. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 4.5: Robustness Check
Explanatory Variables
Const JANt JAN
Post
t ri,t−1 r
US
t−1 TIMEt V OLt
Panel A: Poland – Institutional Sample I (N = 20)
0.0299∗∗ 0.3404∗∗∗ −0.1562† −0.0066 0.3471∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0833) (0.1023) (0.0053) (0.0118)
0.0608 0.3411∗∗∗ −0.2140∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.0000
(0.0376) (0.0845) (0.1051) (0.0053) (0.0000)
−0.4639∗∗∗ 0.4024∗∗∗ −0.3420∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0634∗∗∗
(0.1031) (0.0835) (0.1039) (0.0053) (0.0128)
0.0265 0.3420∗∗∗ −0.1589† −0.0066 0.3471∗∗∗ 0.0000
(0.0376) (0.0850) (0.1059) (0.0053) (0.0118) (0.0000)
−0.4752∗∗∗ 0.3925∗∗∗ −0.2687∗∗∗ −0.0072 0.3472∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗
(0.1035) (0.0839) (0.1048) (0.0053) (0.0118) (0.0129)
Panel B: Hungary – Institutional Sample I (N = 17)
−0.0084 0.4344∗∗∗ −0.2880∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.3405∗∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0850) (0.1018) (0.0052) (0.0115)
0.0662∗∗ 0.3969∗∗∗ −0.3024∗∗∗ 0.0329∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗
(0.0334) (0.0851) (0.1019) (0.0051) (0.0000)
−0.2838∗∗∗ 0.5334∗∗∗ −0.4594∗∗∗ 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.0403∗∗∗
(0.0760) (0.0921) (0.1088) (0.0053) (0.0106)
0.0302 0.4115∗∗∗ −0.2577∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.3403∗∗∗ 0.0000
(0.0337) (0.0870) (0.1047) (0.0052) (0.0115) (0.0000)
−0.2454∗∗∗ 0.5021∗∗∗ −0.3613∗∗∗ 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.3487∗∗∗ 0.0336∗∗∗
(0.0769) (0.0920) (0.1097) (0.0054) (0.0118) (0.0107)
Note: The estimated equations are variants with different regressors of the model (4.3) ri,t =
β0 + β1JANt + β2JANPostt + β3ri,t−1 + c
′Xt + ui + ei,t, where stock returns are calculated as
ri,t = 100 ln(Pi,t/Pi,t−1). JANt (JANPostt ) denotes a dummy variable which takes on the value
of 1 in January throughout the whole sample period (in the post-pension system reform period) and
0 otherwise. X′t = (rUSt−1, T IMEt, V OLt) describes a set of control variables, where r
US
t−1 denotes the
one-period lagged return of the S&P 500 Index, TIMEt a linear time trend, and V OLt the log of
aggregate trading volume in the respective home market on day t, V OLt = ln(
∑n
i=1 V OLi,t), with
n the number of individual stocks. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively, and † at the 14% level.
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4.2 Payment Schemes, Individual Traders’ Invest-
ment Decisions, and Stock Market Anomalies
4.2.1 Motivation and Literature Review
Calendar anomalies have played an important role in the finance literature challenging
the efficient market hypothesis (Fama (1970)). While voluminous international evi-
dence and a number of explanations are available, so far researchers have had limited
success in identifying underlying causes which generate stock market anomalies. In
this section, we provide deeper insight into this issue highlighting the role of payments
individual investors receive on a monthly basis. First, salary payments at the end or
the beginning of each month enable individual investors to invest part of their income
in the stock market. The concentration of flow of funds to investors may be responsible
for an anomalous pattern in stock returns in the turn-of-the-month trading days in case
fundamentally relevant information is not available at that time. Second, if individual
investors postpone their investment decision to the weekend due to time considerations,
the availability of financial resources at the end or the beginning of the month may
induce abnormally high stock returns on the first Mondays of each month.
The first argument mentioned above has its origin in the literature on the turn-of-
the-month effect. Ariel (1987) shows for U.S. data that virtually all of the cumulative
stock return appears on the last day of the month and the consecutive first nine trading
days of the following month. Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) confirm this finding for U.S.
stock returns over a period of 90 years of daily data for the last and the first three days
of the month, while Cadsby and Ratner (1992) provide mixed empirical evidence using
an international data set. Ogden (1990) provides an explanation for the turn-of-the-
month effect relying on the standardization of payments at the turn of each calendar
month for the U.S.
While the turn-of-the-month effect does not discriminate between weekdays, the
Monday effect takes into account that stock returns are different on Mondays relative
to the rest of trading days of the week. According to this calendar anomaly, mean stock
returns are significantly negative on Mondays and lower than on other weekdays. The
Monday effect is well-documented for the U.S. (French (1980)) and other mature stock
markets (Jaffe, Westerfield, and Ma (1989)).22 One of the possible explanations for
the Monday anomaly is the specific trading behavior of individual investors. Following
22 For a comprehensive survey of the Monday effect literature see Pettengill (2003).
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Miller (1988), Ritter (1988), and Lakonishok and Maberly (1990), individual investors
typically do not have time during the weekday trading hours and, therefore, process
information and undertake investment decisions only during the weekend. In addition,
Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) find that, when the stock market re-opens on Monday,
individual investors tend to increase selling activity relative to the rest of the week.
The relative higher selling activities by individuals on Mondays compared to the rest
of the week explains, at least in part, the weekend anomaly.
More recently, Brusa, Liu, and Schulman (2003), Brusa and Liu (2004), and Gu
(2004) provide evidence in favor of a reversed Monday effect since 1988 for the U.S.,
i.e., Monday stock returns are on average significantly positive and higher than on
other days of the week. Moreover, positive Monday stock returns are concentrated
in the first and third weeks of the month. While the explanation for the traditional
Monday effect outlined above relies on the trading pattern of individual investors, the
increased trading activities of institutional investors provide an explanation for the
reversed Monday effect. Since the Monday anomaly has become a well-known pattern
in stock returns, sophisticated investors may now fully or over-exploit the opportunity
for abnormal stock returns. Consequently, institutional investors eliminate or reverse
the Monday anomaly found in pre-1988 samples.
We provide new evidence on the turn-of-the-month and the Monday effect relying
on daily time series of individual Polish and Hungarian stocks. Both emerging stock
markets exhibit a specific institutional setting in terms of the investor structure, which
allows a meaningful contribution to the literature on stock market calendar anomalies.
Before the pension system reforms in Poland and Hungary, predominantly individual
investors populated both stock markets. Given the concentration of cash flows to pri-
vate investors at the turn of the month, we expect a surge in stock returns on the
trading days around the turn of the month and the first Mondays of the month. The
sudden appearance of institutional traders due to the pension system reforms may in-
duce a structural change. The dominance of individual investors during the pre-pension
system reform period and the increased institutional ownership afterwards provide a
unique institutional environment to investigate the role of individual investors’ trading
decisions. Additionally, the significance of increased institutional ownership on asset
price dynamics can be assessed.
The remainder of the section proceeds as follows. Subsection 4.2.2 outlines the
institutional background for Poland and Hungary. The econometric methodology is
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described in Subsection 4.2.3, while Subsection 4.2.4 characterizes the data set. Sub-
section 4.2.5 contains the empirical findings, and Subsection 4.2.6 summarizes and
concludes.
4.2.2 Institutional Background
4.2.2.1 Poland
Re-established in 1991, the Polish stock market has grown rapidly during the last
decade in terms of both the number of companies listed and market capitalization.
In comparison to the two other European Union accession countries in the region,
the Czech Republic and Hungary, the capitalization of the Polish stock market is
significantly higher. It is comparable to that of the smaller mature European stock
markets like Austria and was about 60 billion US$ at the end of 2004 (WSE (2005)).
Before the pension system reform in Poland in 1999, predominantly individual
traders invested on the stock market. In 1999, the public pension system was enriched
by a private component, represented by open-end pension funds. Participation in this
component is mandatory for employees below certain age. They are obliged to transfer
7.3% of their gross salary to the government-run social insurance institute called ZakÃlad
Ubezpieczen´ SpoÃlecznych (ZUS), which in turn transfers the collected contributions to
the pension funds.23
The first transfer of money from the ZUS to the pension funds took place on
May 19, 1999. This date marks a change of the investor structure on the Polish stock
market. Before 1999, about 20% domestic institutional investors and 45% domestic
individual investors traded at the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Over time the proportion
of domestic institutional traders has increased, whereas the relative importance of
individual investors has decreased. In 2004, approximately one-third of the investors
were domestic individuals, and about one-third were national institutions. Constantly
about one-third of the investors on the Polish stock market adhere to the group of
foreign investors.
4.2.2.2 Hungary
The Budapest Stock Exchange, re-established in 1990, experienced a significant in-
crease in its capitalization, attaining about 6 billion US$ in 1996, mainly due to the
23 For a more detailed description of the Polish pension system and for further references see
Voronkova and Bohl (2005).
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privatization of Hungary’s bigger state-owned companies such as Mol, OTP, Gedeon
Richter, and Matav. In the following years, the stock market went through a phase
of continuous growth, reaching a capitalization of 30 billion US$ at the end of 2004.
Similarly, in Hungary private pension funds were founded in 1997 and started their fi-
nancial activities in 1998. Before 1998, primarily small individual investors populated
the Hungarian stock market.
In both countries the payment of salaries is concentrated around the turn of the
month. Although differences do exist between some pensioners and employed people,
in the majority of cases salary payment is transferred to the account before the tenth
of the following month. The Polish and Hungarian labor codes define officially the
tenth of each month as the latest date of salary payment. Nevertheless, surveying
people employed in Poland or Hungary indicates that salary is available earlier. In
consequence, a concentration of flow of funds to potential stock market investors is
given in both countries.
4.2.3 Methodology
We assess the effect of increased institutional trading on the magnitude of two stock
market seasonalities.24 In the empirical investigation we rely on a panel framework and
investigate separately two data sets of Polish and Hungarian stocks. The look beyond
aggregate index data proves beneficial since we can exploit the richer information in
the cross-section of returns. Moreover, the advantages of a panel data model over a
purely time-series investigation of index data or individual shares are manifold (see,
e.g., Baltagi (2005)). Most importantly, unobserved individual heterogeneity can be
controlled for that would otherwise have to go undetected and could generate biased
results. For the turn-of-the-month and the Monday effect the following one-way error
component regression models are run, respectively:
ri,t = α0 + α1TOMt + α2TOM
Inst
t + α3r
US
t−1 + α4ri,t−1 + ui + ei,t, (4.5)
ri,t = β0 + β1FirstMont + β2FirstMon
Inst
t + β3r
US
t−1 + β4ri,t−1 + υi + νi,t. (4.6)
The subscript i denotes the cross-sectional and t the time-series dimension of the data
set. The dependent variable is the daily stock return ri,t, calculated as the logarithmic
24 The Polish pension system reform, the associated increase in institutional trading, and its im-
plications for market efficiency/stabilization have been investigated with different foci in previous
literature: Bohl, Brzeszczyn´ski, and Wilfling (2008) and Bohl and Brzeszczyn´ski (2006) examine
stock return volatility, Ge¸bka, Henke, and Bohl (2006) return autocorrelation, and Voronkova and
Bohl (2005) scrutinize the investment behavior of pension funds.
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difference in prices ri,t = 100 ln(Pi,t/Pi,t−1). Pi,t denotes the individual stock price at
the close of every trading day.
The dummy variables in Equations (4.5) and (4.6) are defined as follows. TOMt
is a turn-of-month dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 for the last and the
first five trading days of each month throughout the whole sample period (0 otherwise).
In an alternative specification, TOMt is 1 for the last and the first three trading days
of each month (0 otherwise). The dummy variable TOM Instt is 1 only for those turn-
of-month trading days that fall into the period of increased institutional trading at the
Warsaw and Budapest Stock Exchanges, i.e., beginning with June 1999 for Poland and
January 1999 for Hungary (0 otherwise). Accordingly, FirstMont is a Monday indica-
tor variable which is 1 for the first Monday and, alternatively, for the first and second
Mondays of each month (0 otherwise). FirstMonInstt captures the first Monday(s) of
each month during the period of increased institutional trading with a value of 1 and
is 0 otherwise.
In addition, lagged U.S. stock index returns rUSt−1 are included in both regressions
to take into account the international influence on both emerging stock markets. We
also allow for stock returns autocorrelation in the time-series dimension by including
the lagged dependent variable ri,t−1 as an additional explanatory variable.25 ui and υi
denote unobservable stock-specific random effects: ui ∼ N(0, σ2u) and υi ∼ N(0, σ2υ).
ei,t and νi,t are the remainder disturbances: ei,t ∼ N(0, σ2e) and νi,t ∼ N(0, σ2ν).26
In the above specifications, a positive and significant parameter α1 (β1) pro-
vides evidence in favor of a turn-of-the-month (Monday) effect in stock returns. For
the interpretation of the parameters α2 and β2, three cases have to be distinguished.
First, a negative and significant coefficient α2 (β2) indicates a reduction of positive
turn-of-the-month (Monday) stock returns due to the entrance of pension funds as
institutional investors into the market. Second, if α2 (β2) is positive and significant,
then institutional investors’ trading behavior strengthens the effects. Third, if α2 (β2)
is statistically insignificant, institutions do not have an influence on the effects. The
sum α1 + α2 (β1 + β2) provides a measure of the magnitude of the turn-of-the-month
(Monday) effect in the period of increased institutional trading.
25 In panels with a short time dimension the presence of lagged dependent variables causes incon-
sistent and biased estimates. However, in our case T is quite large so that the bias resulting from the
presence of a lagged dependent variable can be neglected (Judson and Owen (1999), Baltagi (2005)).
26 The model selection is supported by Hausman specification tests (Hausman (1978)). We also test
for serial correlation in the error distribution with Lagrange-multiplier (LM) tests (Breusch (1978),
Godfrey (1978)).
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4.2.4 Data
4.2.4.1 Data Sources
Poland. The data for Poland contain daily closing prices for all stocks listed on the
Warsaw Stock Exchange in the period from October 3, 1994 to March 31, 2004.27 These
time series were directly provided by the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). Altogether,
the sample comprises 278 firms over the indicated sample period. The time series are
stock-split adjusted.
To investigate the impact of the pension funds’ investment activities, we construct
a subsample of actively institutionally traded stocks as follows. We calculate a measure
of each stock’s institutional coverage by dividing the aggregate pension fund holdings
of that stock by the overall aggregate pension fund holdings in a particular year. This
measure can be interpreted as the percentage share of a particular stock in the aggregate
pension fund holdings. A stock is defined as actively institutionally traded in a given
year if the measure of relative institutional holdings exceeds 1%.28
We calculate this measure for all stocks and all years separately during the 1999–
2003 period and end up with five yearly measures of relative pension fund holdings
for each individual stock. A stock is included in the sample of actively institutionally
traded stocks if the pension fund holding measure of this stock exceeds the 1% level
in at least two out of the five years, equivalent to 40% of the post-event period. This
criterion results in the identification of 28 stocks as institutionally traded. Columns 1
and 2 of Table 4.6 provide additional information about these stocks. Whereas Polish
pension fund investors do not have a preference for stocks of a specific sector, they
concentrate their investments on large firms’ stocks.
[Insert Table 4.6 here]
27 The selection of the start date is due to the following reasoning. Shortly after its re-opening,
the Polish stock market experienced a stock price increase of 924% from May 6, 1993 to March 8,
1994, and a subsequent crash. Furthermore, it was not until October 3, 1994, that trading on the
Warsaw Stock Exchange was extended from four days to five days a week. Starting our inquiry at the
beginning of October 1994 ensures that the empirical findings are neither distorted by the bubble and
crash periods nor affected by the change in trading frequency.
28 We drop stocks with only marginal institutional coverage as for these stocks institutional trading
behavior may not have a large impact on stock returns. The 1% cut-off point is arbitrarily chosen
but proved to be an acceptable compromise for the purpose of our study: On the one hand, it allows
us to eliminate those stocks which are not at all or only marginally covered by institutional investors
and to come up with a limited number of stocks that are actively traded by institutions. On the other
hand, the size of the resulting subsamples is still sufficient for econometric testing.
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Hungary. For Hungary, the data consist of daily closing prices for the stocks listed
on the Budapest Stock Exchange in the period from January 3, 1994 to December 31,
2004. The time series were obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream. Altogether,
the cross-section of the sample comprises 84 firms.29
To determine a subsample of institutionally traded stocks for the Hungarian stock
market, we requested the portfolio holdings of all Hungarian pension funds. The pen-
sion funds’ replies show that their stock market investment decisions closely mirror the
composition of the main stock index BUX. In the sample of Hungarian stocks actively
traded by institutional investors, we therefore focus on the stocks included in the BUX.
Information on the BUX composition was provided by the Budapest Stock Exchange
(BSE) for the 1996–2004 period. Contrary to Poland, we do not use a 1% cut-off cri-
terion because the BUX is dominated by very few stocks with high weights. Hence,
a cut-off point as the one mentioned above would considerably reduce our sample in
size. The number of stocks included in the institutional sample would be too small to
conduct a cross-sectional investigation.
As a definition of institutionally traded stocks that is roughly in line with the
selection criterion for Poland, we use all stocks that are included in the BUX for at least
40% of the time in the post-reform sample period from 1998 to 2004. This definition
results in the identification of 19 institutionally traded stocks. Columns 3 and 4 of
Table 4.6 list the Hungarian companies selected together with their sector affiliations.
4.2.4.2 Summary Statistics
Table 4.7 and 4.8 report some descriptive statistics for the data set: Table 4.7 shows av-
erage stock returns on turn-of-the-month versus regular trading days, and Table 4.8 dis-
plays average Monday returns as compared to the rest of the week. Both tables contain
daily mean returns for the actively institutionally traded and the non-institutionally
traded stocks as well as the complete sample of stocks. These are calculated for the
entire period as well as pre- and post-reform periods for Poland (Panel A) and Hungary
(Panel B). In addition, the number of observations is reported.
29 Since we lack information on stock splits for Hungary, a conservative estimation approach is
called for in order to mitigate the impact of potential outliers (due to stock splits or other factors).
Therefore we applied a trimming procedure to the data set, deleted the 0.5% of highest and lowest
returns, and generated all results for the modified data set. Since the influence of outliers seems to
be marginal, we rely on this setting as a robustness check and do not report results in the following.
The same robustness check was carried out for Poland.
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As can be seen from Table 4.7, average stock returns for turn-of-the-month trading
days are positive and higher compared to the mean return for the remaining trading
days of the month, with the average turn-of-month return amounting to up to 25
basis points over the entire investigation period for the Polish institutional sample.
Moreover, mean stock returns are higher during the pre- than during the post-reform
period. For Poland, pre-reform turn-of-month returns are about five times higher than
their post-reform counterparts throughout all samples and drop from 49 to 11 basis
points for the subsample of institutionally traded stocks. For Hungary, the observed
difference is less pronounced.
Table 4.8 contains mean Monday stock returns as they are distributed across the
month, i.e., all Mondays in a given month are numbered from 1 to 4 or 5.30 While the
first Monday of each month exhibits on average a positive stock return, the following
Mondays show returns which are much lower and often negative. Similar to the picture
conveyed in Table 4.7, mean stock returns are substantially lower in the post- compared
to the pre-reform period. This pattern is very clear-cut for all Polish subsamples. For
instance, average returns on the first Monday of the month are about 64 basis points
among institutionally covered stocks over the entire sample period, a sharp decline from
106 to 39 basis points being detected from pre- to post-reform period. For Hungary,
both absolute numbers for the Monday effect and the drop from pre- to post-reform
returns are considerably higher for the institutional subsample.
[Insert Table 4.7 here]
[Insert Table 4.8 here]
4.2.5 Empirical Results
Table 4.9 displays the empirical findings from regression model (4.5) for the turn-of-
the-month effect. We find evidence in favor of a pronounced turn-of-the-month effect
in the period when the Polish and the Hungarian stock markets were dominated by
individual investors. This holds for all subsamples with the exception of the non-
institutional sample for Hungary, where there seem to be no increased returns around
the turn of the month. Nearly all other coefficient estimates of the dummy variable
30 This approach slightly differs from Brusa and Liu (2004), where the authors use the belonging
of each Monday to a particular week of the month as an ordering scheme. For the purpose of our
inquiry, however, the classification outlined above is more straightforward and appealing.
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TOMt are statistically significant at the 1% level, ranging in absolute height from 0.55
(institutional sample Poland) to 0.13 (whole sample Hungary).
Moreover, for all Polish samples the magnitude of the turn-of-the-month effect
decreases notably in the period after the pension fund investors’ entrance into the stock
market, measured by the coefficients of the institutional investor dummy TOM Instt .
The estimated parameter values are all highly significant and lie between −0.39 and
−0.17. The anomalous turn-of-the-month effect in stock returns does not entirely
disappear after the entrance of pension funds as institutional investors into the Polish
stock market. However, its magnitude becomes substantially lower. The Hungarian
stock market experiences this development to a lesser extent, and only in the subsample
of the 19 stocks most covered by institutional investors we do perceive a significant
decline in previously above-average turn-of-month returns.31
[Insert Table 4.9 here]
The empirical results for the Monday effect as estimated in Equation (4.6) are
displayed in Table 4.10. The estimation results for both countries show clearly superior
returns on the first Monday of the month in the period before the increased investment
activities of pension funds started. The estimated parameters of the dummy variable
FirstMont are between 1.06 and 0.92 for Poland (all statistically significant at 1%
level) and between 0.64 and 0.21 for Hungary (all statistically significant at 10% level
or better).32
The anomalous returns on the first Monday of the month, again, decrease drasti-
cally after the entrance of pension funds into the Polish stock market with statistically
significant coefficients for FirstMonInstt of about −0.70. For Hungary, we can attest a
significant downturn in abnormally high First-Monday returns due to intensified invest-
ment activities by institutional investors in all but the non-institutional subsamples.
[Insert Table 4.10 here]
31 The findings for the alternative specification when turn-of-month trading days are defined as
the last trading day of a given month plus the first three trading days of the following month are
qualitatively the same but less pronounced (not reported but available upon request). Since the
payment of salaries is somewhat scattered around the turn of the month, we are not overly surprised
by this outcome.
32 Again, findings are qualitatively identical but less marked in absolute numbers when investigating
the abnormal returns on the first and second Monday of the month relative to the remaining trading
days. The results of this robustness check are not reported but can be obtained from the author upon
request.
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All results are robust across different specifications of the regression equations
and are qualitatively unaffected by the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable ri,t−1
and lagged U.S. stock returns rUSt−1. We find a significant positive relationship between
lagged U.S. stock returns and the performance of the two emerging stock markets
investigated as well as significant negative return autocorrelation for all except for the
institutional subsamples.
4.2.6 Summary and Conclusions
This article examines the role of payments individual investors receive explaining the
turn-of-the-month effect and the Monday effect. The empirical investigation relies on
daily time series of individual Polish and Hungarian stocks which are analyzed in a
panel framework. The stock markets in Poland and Hungary provide an interesting
institutional framework to study both stock market anomalies: Before the pension sys-
tem reforms in both countries at the end of the 1990s, primarily individual investors
populated the stock markets. This provides the basis for investigating the importance
of the concentration of cash flows individual investors receive at the end and the be-
ginning of each month in explaining the turn-of-the-month and the Monday anomaly.
Moreover, the increased institutional ownership due to the pension system reform pro-
vides information about a structural change and the influence of institutional investors
on the anomalies.
In Poland and Hungary, salaries of employed people are normally paid at the end
of each month so that a concentration of cash flows appears at the beginning of each
month. During the period of primarily individual trading the evidence is favorable
for a pronounced turn-of-the-month effect and anomalously high stock returns on the
first Monday of each month. Hence, regular payment schemes seem to be driving
forces of both stock market anomalies. After the entrance of institutional investors
into both stock markets due to the pension system reform the magnitude of both
anomalies decrease notably in the majority of cases analyzed. This refers in particular
to the subsamples of actively institutionally traded stocks. If stock returns exhibit
exploitable regularities, then smart traders are expected to take advantage of these
patterns, thereby earning abnormal profits. On stock markets with a sufficiently large
number of institutional investors as smart traders, anomalies are supposed to disappear
as the trading of this investor group arbitrages away seasonal patterns in returns.
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4.2.7 Tables
Table 4.6: Stocks Actively Traded by Institutional Investors
Poland Hungary
Company Sector Company Sector
Agora Media Antenna Broadcasting
BPH Banking Borsodchem Chemicals
BRE Banking Danubius Hotels
BSK Banking Demasz Electricity Supply
Budimex Construction Egis Pharmaceuticals
Computerland IT Fotex Retail Trade
De¸bica Chemicals Magyar Telekom Telecommunications
Echo Construction MOL Oil/Natural Gas
Ke¸ty Metals NABI Engineering/Machinery
KGHM Metals OTP Banking
Orbis Hotels Pannonplast Plastics Industry
PBK Banking Pick Szeged Food Products
Pekao Banking Ra´ba Machinery
PGF Wholesale & Retails Richter Pharmaceuticals
PKN Chemicals Synergon IT
Prokom IT TVK Chemicals
Stomil Chemicals Zalakera´mia Construction
S´wiecie Wood & Paper
TPSA Telecommunications
WBK Banking
Note: The table presents the stocks identified as actively traded by institutional investors and their
corresponding sectors. The selection criteria are described in the text.
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Table 4.7: Average Turn-of-Month Stock Returns
Entire Period Pre-Reform Period Post-Reform Period
Trading Days Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
Panel A: Poland
Institutional Sample (28 Stocks)
Regular −0.0583 36,487 −0.1027 13,318 −0.0327 23,169
Turn-of-Month 0.2495 14,743 0.4926 5,447 0.1070 9,296
Total 0.0303 51,230 0.0701 18,765 0.0073 32,465
Non-Institutional Sample (250 Stocks)
Regular −0.1161 242,114 −0.2216 75,689 −0.0681 166,425
Turn-of-Month 0.1068 97,579 0.2382 30,767 0.0463 66,812
Total −0.0521 339,693 −0.0887 106,456 −0.0353 233,237
Whole Sample (278 Stocks)
Regular −0.1085 278,601 −0.2038 89,007 −0.0638 189,594
Turn-of-Month 0.1255 112,322 0.2765 36,214 0.0537 76,108
Total −0.0413 390,923 −0.0649 125,221 −0.0301 265,702
Panel B: Hungary
Institutional Sample (19 Stocks)
Regular −0.0372 31,183 −0.0182 11,079 −0.0476 20,104
Turn-of-Month 0.1660 11,851 0.3015 4,189 0.0920 7,662
Total 0.0188 43,034 0.0695 15,268 −0.0091 27,766
Non-Institutional Sample (65 Stocks)
Regular −0.0621 67,760 −0.0784 27,339 −0.0511 40,421
Turn-of-Month −0.0002 25,766 0.0059 10,357 −0.0042 15,409
Total −0.0450 93,526 −0.0552 37,696 −0.0381 55,830
Whole Sample (84 Stocks)
Regular −0.0542 98,943 −0.0610 38,418 −0.0499 60,525
Turn-of-Month 0.0522 37,617 0.0910 14,546 0.0277 23,071
Total −0.0249 136,560 −0.0193 52,964 −0.0285 83,596
Note: Mean stock returns are calculated as simple arithmetic averages of daily returns and reported
in percent. “Turn-of-Month” trading days are defined as the last trading day of a given month plus
the first five trading days of the following month. All other trading days are subsumed under the label
“Regular”. “Obs.” denotes the number of observations. For Poland the overall sample period is from
October 3, 1994 to March 31, 2004. May 19, 1999 marks the date of the Polish pension system reform.
For Hungary the overall sample period is from January 3, 1994 to December 31, 2004. January 1,
1999 approximately marks the date of the Hungarian pension system reform.
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Table 4.8: Average Monday Stock Returns
Entire Period Pre-Reform Period Post-Reform Period
Position of Monday Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
Panel A: Poland
Institutional Sample (28 Stocks)
1st Monday in Month 0.6382 2,274 1.0635 836 0.3909 1,438
2nd −”− −0.1374 2,342 0.1218 823 −0.2778 1,519
3rd −”− −0.1450 2,395 −0.0749 904 −0.1875 1,491
4th −”− −0.1421 2,363 −0.1335 874 −0.1472 1,489
5th −”− −0.2518 843 −0.0535 283 −0.3520 560
All Mondays 0.0229 10,217 0.2123 3,720 −0.0855 6,497
Non-Institutional Sample (250 Stocks)
1st Monday in Month 0.4769 14,999 0.9768 4,672 0.2508 10,327
2nd −”− 0.0238 15,607 0.3518 4,703 −0.1177 10,904
3rd −”− −0.1496 15,920 −0.0278 5,185 −0.2084 10,735
4th −”− −0.0269 15,690 −0.1203 4,992 0.0167 10,698
5th −”− −0.0770 5,611 0.0781 1,620 −0.1400 3,991
All Mondays 0.0632 67,827 0.2645 21,172 −0.0281 46,655
Whole Sample (278 Stocks)
1st Monday in Month 0.4981 17,273 0.9899 5,508 0.2679 11,765
2nd −”− 0.0028 17,949 0.3175 5,526 −0.1372 12,423
3rd −”− −0.1490 18,315 −0.0348 6,089 −0.2059 12,226
4th −”− −0.0420 18,053 −0.1222 5,866 −0.0033 12,187
5th −”− −0.0998 6,454 0.0586 1,903 −0.1660 4,551
All Mondays 0.0580 78,044 0.2567 24,892 −0.0351 53,152
(Continued)
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Table 4.8 – Continued
Entire Period Pre-Reform Period Post-Reform Period
Position of Monday Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
Panel B: Hungary
Institutional Sample (19 Stocks)
1st Monday in Month 0.3165 1,973 0.6421 696 0.1390 1,277
2nd −”− 0.0821 1,978 0.2359 701 −0.0024 1,277
3rd −”− −0.0755 1,979 −0.1850 703 −0.0151 1,276
4th −”− −0.0590 1,981 −0.1706 705 0.0026 1,276
5th −”− 0.1517 691 0.3360 247 0.0492 444
All Mondays 0.0727 8,602 0.1458 3,052 0.0325 5,550
Non-Institutional Sample (65 Stocks)
1st Monday in Month 0.0458 4,291 0.1607 1,723 −0.0313 2,568
2nd −”− −0.0783 4,290 0.0615 1,726 −0.1725 2,564
3rd −”− −0.1685 4,300 0.1487 1,737 −0.3834 2,563
4th −”− −0.0522 4,309 0.0204 1,742 −0.1014 2,567
5th −”− −0.0065 1,505 −0.1925 611 0.1206 894
All Mondays −0.0588 18,695 0.0742 7,539 −0.1486 11,156
Whole Sample (84 Stocks)
1st Monday in Month 0.1311 6,264 0.2992 2,419 0.0253 3,845
2nd −”− −0.0277 6,268 0.1119 2,427 −0.1159 3,841
3rd −”− −0.1392 6,279 0.0526 2,440 −0.2610 3,839
4th −”− −0.0543 6,290 −0.0346 2,447 −0.0669 3,843
5th −”− 0.0433 2,196 −0.0404 858 0.0969 1,338
All Mondays −0.0173 27,297 0.0948 10,591 −0.0884 16,706
Note: Mean stock returns are calculated as simple arithmetic averages of daily returns and reported
in percent. “Turn-of-Month” trading days are defined as the last trading day of a given month plus
the first five trading days of the following month. All other trading days are subsumed under the label
“Regular”. “Obs.” denotes the number of observations. For Poland the overall sample period is from
October 3, 1994 to March 31, 2004. May 19, 1999 marks the date of the Polish pension system reform.
For Hungary the overall sample period is from January 3, 1994 to December 31, 2004. January 1,
1999 approximately marks the date of the Hungarian pension system reform.
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Table 4.9: Regression Results for the Turn-of-the-Month Effect
Regression Coefficients
Const TOMt TOM
Inst
t r
US
t−1 ri,t−1
Panel A: Poland
Institutional Sample (28 Stocks)
−0.0571∗∗∗ 0.4911∗∗∗ −0.3362∗∗∗ 0.3774∗∗∗ 0.0111
(0.0166) (0.0508) (0.0554) (0.0138) (0.0081)
−0.0583∗∗∗ 0.5509∗∗∗ −0.3856∗∗∗
(0.0166) (0.0506) (0.0553)
Non-Institutional Sample (250 Stocks)
−0.1497∗∗∗ 0.3199∗∗∗ −0.1722∗∗∗ 0.3436∗∗∗ −0.0323∗∗∗
(0.0393) (0.0230) (0.0274) (0.0063) (0.0085)
−0.3125 0.3528∗∗∗ −0.1896∗∗∗
(0.2329) (0.0231) (0.0273)
Whole Sample (278 Stocks)
−0.1395∗∗∗ 0.3476∗∗∗ −0.1997∗∗∗ 0.3489∗∗∗ −0.0287∗∗∗
(0.0355) (0.0210) (0.0249) (0.0058)
−0.2851 0.3825∗∗∗ −0.2190∗∗∗
(0.2092) (0.0211) (0.0248)
Panel B: Hungary
Institutional Sample (19 Stocks)
−0.0410∗∗ 0.2964∗∗∗ −0.1692∗∗∗ 0.4136∗∗∗ −0.0057
(0.0163) (0.0575) (0.0630) (0.0175) (0.0153)
−0.0381∗∗ 0.3376∗∗∗ −0.2079∗∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0559) (0.0613)
Non-Institutional Sample (65 Stocks)
−0.0734∗∗∗ 0.0621 −0.0027 0.1089∗∗∗ −0.0748∗∗∗
(0.0252) (0.0730) (0.0856) (0.0211) (0.0151)
−0.0621∗∗ 0.0680 −0.0101
(0.0250) (0.0711) (0.0833)
Whole Sample (84 Stocks)
−0.0637∗∗∗ 0.1318∗∗ −0.0487 0.2149∗∗∗ −0.0684∗∗∗
(0.0180) (0.0547) (0.0627) (0.0153) (0.0138
−0.0542∗∗∗ 0.1453∗∗∗ −0.0633
(0.0178) (0.0529) (0.0608)
Note: The model estimated is (4.5) ri,t = α0+α1TOMt+α2TOM Instt +α3rUSt−1+α4ri,t−1+ui+ ei,t,
where stock returns are calculated as ri,t = 100 ln(Pi,t/Pi,t−1). TOMt (TOM Instt ) denotes a dummy
variable which takes on the value of 1 for the last and the first five trading days of each month
throughout the whole sample period (during the period of increased institutional trading at theWarsaw
and Budapest Stock Exchanges) and 0 otherwise. ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
CHAPTER 4. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY 111
Table 4.10: Regression Results for the Monday Effect
Regression Coefficients
Const F irstMont FirstMon
Inst
t r
US
t−1 ri,t−1
Panel A: Poland
Institutional Sample (28 Stocks)
0.0011 0.9236∗∗∗ −0.6735∗∗∗ 0.3770∗∗∗ 0.0109
(0.0142) (0.1360) (0.1528) (0.0138) (0.0081)
0.0021 1.0615∗∗∗ −0.6727∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.1311) (0.1482)
Non-Institutional Sample (250 Stocks)
−0.1126∗∗∗ 0.9690∗∗∗ −0.7207∗∗∗ 0.3422∗∗∗ −0.0325∗∗∗
(0.0384) (0.0599) (0.0724) (0.0063) (0.0085)
−0.2796 1.0488∗∗∗ −0.7204∗∗∗
(0.2452) (0.0580) (0.0708)
Whole Sample (278 Stocks)
−0.1001∗∗∗ 0.9659∗∗∗ −0.7162∗∗∗ 0.3476∗∗∗ −0.0289∗∗∗
(0.0347) (0.0549) (0.0660) (0.0058) (0.0079)
−0.2495 1.0497∗∗∗ −0.7134∗∗∗
(0.2202) (0.0531) (0.0644)
Panel B: Hungary
Institutional Sample (19 Stocks)
0.0005 0.5596∗∗∗ −0.5475∗∗∗ 0.4149∗∗∗ −0.0053
(0.0145) (0.1215) (0.1387) (0.0175) (0.0153)
0.0032 0.6358∗∗∗ −0.5002∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.1181) (0.1342)
Non-Institutional Sample (65 Stocks)
−0.0612∗∗∗ 0.2180∗ −0.2095 0.1092∗∗∗ −0.0748∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.1137) (0.1581) (0.0211) (0.0151)
−0.0494∗∗ 0.2101∗ −0.1920
(0.0219) (0.1108) (0.1517)
Whole Sample (84 Stocks)
−0.0419∗∗∗ 0.3181∗∗∗ −0.3070∗∗∗ 0.2156∗∗∗ −0.0683∗∗∗
(0.0158) (0.0886) (0.1171) (0.0153) (0.0138)
−0.0324∗∗ 0.3316∗∗∗ −0.2739∗∗
(0.0157) (0.0859) (0.1123)
Note: The model estimated is (4.6) ri,t = α0+α1FirstMont+α2FirstMonInstt +α3rUSt−1+α4ri,t−1+
υi + νi,t, where stock returns are calculated as ri,t = 100 ln(Pi,t/Pi,t−1). FirstMont (FirstMonInstt )
denotes a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 for the first Monday of each month throughout
the whole sample period (during the period of increased institutional trading at the Warsaw and
Budapest Stock Exchanges) and 0 otherwise. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to appraise various political and institutional aspects of
stock return dynamics. It thereby contributes to a lively debate in the recent finance
literature and bridges a gaping chasm between the available empirical evidence and
the informational requirements of practitioners and academia alike. The findings are
presented in five self-contained essays that are grouped in three broader yet speciated
chapters. Specifically, the investigation embraces the following elements: political pat-
terns in stock market returns, stock market volatility around elections, and the impact
of institutional investors’ trading activities on stock market efficiency.
The opening chapter, “Political Cycles in Stock Market Returns”, consists of
two essays that shed light on the international pervasiveness of political stock market
anomalies. Recently, two paradoxes have been affirmed to hold on U.S. stock markets:
the Democrat premium (Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003)), implying higher returns
under Democratic administrations, and the presidential cycle effect (Booth and Booth
(2003)), imposing a pronounced election cycle on security returns. The persistence of
these patterns presents a serious challenge to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).
Since both irregularities have been studied extensively for the U.S. but not yet on a
global scale, the call for international evidence was eminent. Moreover, overcoming the
single-country approach adopted in prior studies proves beneficial from the statistical
point of view as more powerful econometric testing is possible.
The first essay in this chapter, therefore, investigates the relation of political cy-
cles and stock returns in an international data set covering the 15 largest mature stock
markets in terms of market capitalization. In addition to an empirical analysis of a
broad sample of individual countries, this setup allows for the application of a panel
framework. The results suggest that the aforementioned anomalous cyclical patterns
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are not strikingly pervasive global phenomena but rather limited to the U.S. and few
other incidences. This finding is robust and valid after controlling for business cycle
fluctuations. The panel regressions do not support either of the two anomalies, lending
some support to the notion of informational efficiency with regard to politically-induced
factors. The second essay explicitly takes into account that an aggregate analysis based
on monthly data might still not be sufficient to capture the return dynamics around
and in-between elections. Thus, a further test based on daily data and comprising
24 OECD countries is presented. The evolution of returns around Election Day is
scrutinized in an event-study framework, funnelling into the conclusion that there are
no significant abnormal returns to achieve around election dates. Furthermore, the
results in the first essay are buttressed in that statistically significant return differen-
tials between the tenures of left-wing and right-wing governments are hard to detect.
Consequently, international investment strategies based on the political orientation of
countries’ leadership are likely to be futile.
The following chapter, “Stock Market Volatility around National Elections”,
shifts focus from the first to the second moment of return distribution and investi-
gates whether the event of a national election induces higher stock market volatility
in a sample of 27 OECD countries. It is found that the country-specific component
of index return variance can easily double during the week around the election, which
attests to the fact that investors are surprised by the actual election outcome. Sev-
eral factors like narrow margin of victory, lack of compulsory voting laws, change in
the political orientation of the government, or the failure to form a coalition with a
majority of seats in parliament significantly contribute to the magnitude of the elec-
tion shock. These findings have important implications for the optimal strategies of
risk-averse stock market investors and participants of the option markets: While the
former can expect higher utility from diversifying their portfolios internationally due
to low premia for bearing the election risk in their home country, the latter could de-
sign some profitable volatility-based trading strategies. Moreover, our results are of
topical interest to pollsters since the large election surprise indicates room for further
improvements.
Finally, the last chapter, “Institutional Investors and Stock Market Efficiency”,
is compounded by two studies that assess the impact of institutional trading on stock
market efficiency. The evidence provided in this chapter helps resolve an ongoing
academic controversy on the ultimate effect of institutional investors’ trading activities.
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A priori, large pension or investment funds might move security prices towards greater
efficiency through their better informedness or away from it through peculiarities in
their trading behavior. The Polish and Hungarian emerging stock markets provide an
interesting institutional setting to explore this issue because their history encompasses
periods of predominately individual trading as well as increased institutional trading.
In both countries, pension system reforms in the late 1990s and an associated increase
in investment activities by large pension fund investors provide a natural experiment
to investigate the impact of increased institutional trading on stock returns.
The first essay in this chapter utilizes the unique institutional characteristic de-
scribed to provide evidence on the impact of institutional versus individual investors on
the January stock market anomaly. Robust empirical results suggest that the increase
in institutional ownership has reduced the magnitude of an anomalous January effect
previously induced by the trading behavior of individual investors. The second essay
addresses the implications of payment patterns on the Monday effect and the turn-
of-the-month stock market anomaly. Again, the consequences of a changing investor
structure are subjected to scrutiny. We find robust empirical evidence in favor of ab-
normally high stock returns on the first Mondays of the month and the trading days
around the turn of the month. This pattern is consistent with the payment schemes
in both countries and more pronounced during the period of predominately individ-
ual trading. Hence, the hypothesis that increased institutional trading leads to higher
informational efficiency is supported.
Summing up, this thesis carried out a thorough analysis of relevant political
and institutional factors with a bearing on stock return dynamics. At the end of
the day, the factors considered do not seem to require the general rejection of the
basic premise of efficient markets, a comforting result for the proponents of the EMH.
Nonetheless, challenges for future research are abundant and clamant, particularly at
the interface between political economy and finance. Clearly, moving beyond aggregate
stock market indices to the richer information in the cross-section of returns seems
worthwhile, along the path Knight (2007) starts down. Another promising extension
lies in the exploration of high-frequency data to gain a better understanding of market
dynamics in response to political news (Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2007)). The
emergence of liquid prediction markets increasingly devoted to the coverage of political
events does come in handy towards realizing this aspiration.
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